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LOOSING THE FOX AMONGST THE CHICKENS: THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT OVERRULES
ROYAL GLOBE IN MORADI-SHALAL v.
FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE
COMPANIES
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979, the California Supreme Court decided the landmark case,
Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.1 In Royal Globe, the court
held that California Insurance Code section 790.03(h)2 provided third-
party claimants with an implied right of action against insurance compa-
1. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
2. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989). Section 790.03(h) prohibits
the following:
(h) knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a gen-
eral business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions
relating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communica-
tions with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt inves-
tigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after
proof of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable set-
tlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered
in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims for
amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to
which a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written
or printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was al-
tered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative,
agent, or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon
request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of ap-
pealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded
in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured,
claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then
requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which
submissions contain substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent,
under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements
under other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied
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nies that commit the various enumerated unfair or deceptive practices.3
For the next decade the decision served as the legal linchpin in third-
party bad faith claims.'
Last year, the same court in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Cos.' spun 180 degrees and overruled Royal Globe, holding that
section 790.03(h) does not contain a right of action for third-party claim-
ants.' In addition, the court ruled that Royal Globe actions pending at
the time of the Moradi-Shalal decision would require a final judgment of
liability against the insured before the insurer could be held liable to
third parties under section 790.03(h).7
This Note first summarizes California's bad faith laws governing the
insurance industry prior to Moradi-Shalal. The Author then analyzes
the reasoning of the Moradi-Shalal court in overruling Royal Globe and
discusses the possible ramifications of that decision. Finally, this Note
suggests that the Legislature reinstate the Royal Globe holding.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Common-Law Bad Faith Actions Against Insurers
Given the importance of insurance contracts in providing society
with financial security, it follows that such contracts are affected with a
substantial public interest.' Unfortunately, there exists such a disparity
in bargaining power between insurance carriers and private individuals9
that the courts have found it necessary to impose a duty on insurers to
deal fairly and in good faith with their insureds and others affected by an
on in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of
a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
Id.
3. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
4. See, eg., Afso v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 859, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 490 (1985); Vega v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 922, 216 Cal. Rptr.
592 (1985); Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 90 Cal. Rptr. 705
(1983).
5. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
6. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
7. Id. at 313, 758 P.2d at 74-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
8. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970) (insurance business offers services quasi-public in nature and is affected with a public
interest).
9. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269-71, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal. Rptr.
104, 107-08 (1966). This disparity is both in financial bargaining power and in bargaining
expertise when negotiating an insurance contract. Id.
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insurance contract.1" Originally, this duty extended only to insureds and
was based on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing present
in all contracts.1 '
Effectively, this covenant has forced liability insurers to attempt set-
tlement whenever a risk of a judgment against the insured in excess of the
policy's coverage limit exists.' 2 If an insurer unreasonably refuses to set-
tle within the policy limits and an excess verdict follows, a cause of ac-
tion for common-law bad faith arises in favor of the insured.
13
Originally, recovery was limited to the amount of the judgment against
the insured that exceeded the policy limits. 4 This amount could only be
recovered in a bad faith action brought by the insured15 since the duty to
act fairly is implied in the actual insurance contract and, therefore, ex-
tends only to the insured.1 6 A third-party claimant17 could bring a com-
mon-law bad faith action only after having first obtained an assignment
of the bad faith cause of action from the insured.' 8
The California Supreme Court then began to broaden insurers' po-
tential scope of liability. In the seminal case of Crisci v. Security Insur-
ance Co.,' 9 the court transformed the good faith rule into an affirmative
duty owed by insurers to their insureds to accept reasonable settlements,
the breach of which could lead to tort liability.20 After Crisci, an insured
could recover general tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and could also recover punitive damages
where the insurer engaged in fraud, oppression or malice.2 '
This duty to accept reasonable settlements, like the earlier duty to
attempt to settle, was ruled to inure only to the insured in Murphy v.
10. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
11. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200. This implied covenant states that "neither party will do
anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement." Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 201-02.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200.
17. There are essentially two types of bad faith claims. A "first-party" claim is made by
the insured itself. A "third-party" claim is made by one who has been injured by the insured.
Thus, a first-party bad faith claim arises when the insurer unreasonably refuses to settle a claim
made by its insured; a third-party bad faith claim is brought by a claimant who has received an
assignment of the insured's cause of action for the excess amount of the verdict. W. SHERN-
oFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITGATION § 3.01 (1987).
18. Id. § 2-16.5.
19. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
20. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
21. Id.
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Allstate Insurance Co.2 2 In Murphy, the California Supreme Court reit-
erated that the only way an injured third-party claimant could sue an
insurer for its bad faith failure to settle a claim within the policy limits
was to obtain a judgment in excess of the policy limits against the insured
and then an assignment of the insured's cause of action against the in-
surer.23 Recovery in such an action was limited to the excess amount of
the verdict against the insured.24 Thus, after Murphy, there was no way
for a third-party claimant to directly recover any tort damages from the
insurer.
B. The Unfair Practices Act
In California, the insurance industry is regulated not only by judi-
cially created doctrines, but also by a statutory scheme. 25 This state stat-
utory scheme was precipitated by developments at the federal level.26
Until 1944, the insurance industry was not considered commerce
within the meaning of the commerce clause of the United States Consti-
tution; thus, the states, not Congress, had the power to regulate insur-
ance. 27 The industry's status abruptly changed, however, after United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association.28 There, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that insurance was indeed commerce and
therefore, subject to federal antitrust laws.29
Congress responded swiftly to the South-Eastern Underwriters deci-
sion by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945.30 In the Act, Con-
gress declared that federal antitrust laws apply to the insurance industry
only insofar as the insurance industry is not regulated by state law. 1
Thus, the Federal Trade Commission would have jurisdiction over the
insurance industry only in states where no state statutory scheme regu-
lated insurance.32
To aid states in regulating the insurance industry on their own, the
22. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
23. Id. at 941-42, 553 P.2d at 586-87, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27.
24. Id. at 941, 553 P.2d at 586, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
25. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
26. See CAL. INS. CODE § 790 (West 1972).
27.' See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868), overruled, United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
28. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
29. Id. at 552-53.
30. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33-34 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982 & Supp. 1986)).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1986).
32. Id.
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National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)3 3 in 1947
drafted a Model Act for the regulation of the insurance industry.3 4 The
purpose of the Model Act was to provide a statutory framework for state
supervision of unfair trade practices by insurers.35 California adopted
most of the Model Act in 1959 by passing the Unfair Practices Act
(UPA).36 The purpose of the UPA mirrored that of the NAIC Model
Act-to regulate California's insurance trade practices and avoid federal
supervision.37
Several provisions of the UPA, codified in the California Insurance
Code, merit comment. First, section 790.03 defines those acts prohibited
as unfair or deceptive practices.38 Section 790.03 was expanded in 1972
by the addition of subsection (h), which prohibits insurers from
"[k]nowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indi-
cate a general business practice" any of the fifteen acts enumerated
therein, such as misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limi-
tations or advising a claimant not to seek legal representation.39 Section
790.03(h) was likewise patterned after a provision of the revised NAIC
Model Act.4°
The UPA also granted enforcement powers to the Insurance Com-
missioner41 which supplement enforcement powers already granted tothe Commissioner by other provisions of the Insurance Code.42 The In-
33. The NAIC is a voluntary association of state insurance commissioners.
34. AN Acr RELATING TO UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR AND DE-
CEPTIvE ACTS AND PRACTICES IN THE BusINEss OF INSURANCE, reprinted in 2 NAT'L ASS'N
INS. COMM'RS PROCEEDINGS 392 (1947).
35. Id. at 392.
36. 1959 Cal. Stat., ch. 1737, § 1, 4187 (codified at CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West
1972 & Supp. 1989)).
37. CAL. INS. CODE § 790 (West 1972). Section 790 states:
The purpose of this article is to regulate trade practices in the business of insurance
in accordance with the intent of Congress as expressed in the [McCarran-Ferguson
Act] by defining, or providing for the determination of, all such practices in this State
which constitute unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined.
Id.
38. Id. § 790.03.
39. 1972 Cal. Stat., ch. 725, § 1, 1314 (codified at CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1972
& Supp. 1989)). See supra note 2 for the complete text of the 15 "unfair claims settlement
practices" prohibited by section 790.03(h). Section 790.03(h) originally listed only thirteen
unfair practices. 1972 Cal. Stat., ch. 725, § 1, 1314. The last two unfair practices were added
in 1975. 1975 Cal. Stat., ch. 790, § 1, 1812.
40. AN Acr RELATING TO UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR AND DE-
CEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES IN THE BusINEss OF INSURANCE reprinted in 1 NAT'L ASS'N
INS. COMM'RS PROCEEDINGS 493-501 (1972).
41. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790.04-.08, 790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
42. Id. § 790.08. Section 790.08 provides: "The powers vested in the commissioner in this
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surance Code authorizes the Commissioner to scrutinize and investigate
business affairs, 43 issue orders to show cause,' hold hearings and issue
injunctive orders,45 impose fines and penalties,16 and suspend or revoke
insurers' licenses for up to one year.4' The Commissioner is also author-
ized to promulgate rules necessary to enforce the UPA.48
C. Pre-Royal Globe Courts and the Unfair Practices Act
Prior to Royal Globe v. Superior Court,49 several courts concluded
that the UPA contained a private right of action. The first of these deci-
sions is Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society."0 Greenberg in-
volved a class action suit by insureds against their insurer.51 The
insureds alleged that the insurer was illegally requiring persons seeking
home loans from the insurer to also buy a policy of whole-life insur-
ance. 2 The insureds argued that such a "tie-in" arrangement 3 violated
section 790.03(c) of the Insurance Code as an unlawful restraint of trade,
entitling them to damages under section 790.09."4 Section 790.09
article shall be additional to any other powers to enforce any penalties, fines or forfeitures,
denials, suspensions or revocations of licenses or certificates authorized by law with respect to
the methods, acts and practices hereby declared to be unfair or deceptive." Id.
43. Id. § 790.04.
44. Id. §§ 790.05-.06.
45. Id. § 790.06.
46. Id. § 790.07.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 790.10.
49. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
50. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
51. Id. at 996, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
52. Id. A whole-life insurance contract entails payment of premiums at a fixed period for
so long as the insured may live. BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 723 (5th ed. 1979). In contrast, a
term-life insurance policy only provides coverage and requires payment of premiums for a
fixed period, which may be renewed at a new rate. Id. A whole-life insurance policy also
accrues a cash reserve, which term insurance does not. Id.
53. A "tie-in" or tying agreement is "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only
on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees
that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Tie-in agreements are illegal per se "whenever a party
has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free
competition in the market for the tied product." Id. at 6.
54. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 998-99, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 473-74. Section 790.03(c)
prohibits "[e]ntering into any agreement to commit, or by any concerted action committing,
any act of boycott, coercion or intimidation resulting in or tending to result in unreasonable
restraint of, or monopoly in, the business of insurance." CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(c) (West
1972 & Supp. 1989). Tie-in sales agreements generally violate the Cartwright Act, California's
antitrust statute. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-17101 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). How-
ever, the Unfair Practices Act has been held to supersede the Cartwright Act in regulating
insurers. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 999 n.2, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 474 n.2.
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provides:
No order to cease and desist issued under this article directed
to any person or subsequent administrative or judicial proceed-
ing to enforce the same shall in any way relieve or absolve such
person from any administrative action against the license or
certificate of such person, civil liability or criminal penalty
under the laws of this State arising out of the methods, acts or
practices found unfair or deceptive. 5
Rejecting the insurer's argument that only the Insurance Commissioner
is empowered to enforce section 790.03, the court of appeal held: "Sec-
tion 790.09... contemplates a private suit to impose civil liability irre-
spective of governmental action against the insurer for violation of a
provision of the Insurance Code. The fair construction is that the person
to whom the civil liability runs may enforce it by an appropriate ac-
tion."56 Thus, since 1973, private parties have not been required to rely
upon the Commissioner to enforce the Insurance Code since section
790.09 was held to create a private right of action. 7
Like Greenberg, Shernoff v. Superior Court58 was also a class action
suit.59 In Shernoff, a group of title insurers were sued for damages on the
grounds that they had conspired to fix title insurance rates." The trial
court had stayed the action on the grounds that only the Insurance Com-
missioner had jurisdiction over rate-fixing claims.61 The California
Court of Appeal lifted the stay, holding that "the Commissioner's juris-
diction is 'primary,' not 'exclusive.' ,62 Moreover, the court noted, sec-
tion 790.09 expressly preserves civil remedies despite the Commissioner's
issuing a cease-and-desist order a.6  Relying on the Greenberg court's in-
terpretation of section 790.09, the Shernoff court held that a private
party injured by an insurer's violation of section 790.03 could bring a suit
for damages under section 790.09. 6"
55. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (1972).
56. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475. In a footnote, the court
also stated that "[a]ny other construction would overturn by implication the rule of Crisci v.
Security Insurance Co." Id. n.5 (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475. 
(
58. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975).
59. Id. at 408, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 409- 10, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
62. Id. at 409, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
63. Id. at 409-10, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
64. Id. (citing Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 470 (1973)).
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D. Royal Globe v. Superior Court
Although prior to Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court6 1 it
had been established that third-party claimants could not sue insurers for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,66 the California
Supreme Court had not decided whether a claimant could sue an insurer
for violations of the Unfair Practices Act (UPA).6 7 This question was
resolved in Royal Globe. In Royal Globe, the plaintiff filed an action for
personal injuries after a slip-and-fall accident in a market.6 Joined with
the market as defendants were Royal Globe, the market's insurer, and an
insurance adjuster employed by Royal Globe. 9 The plaintiff alleged two
violations of Insurance Code section 790.03:70 first, that Royal Globe
refused to attempt in good faith to settle the claim with the injured plain-
tiff;71 and second, that Royal Globe's adjuster had advised the plaintiff
not to consult an attorney.72 Royal Globe demurred on three grounds:
(1) that the Insurance Commissioner was the sole enforcer of the UPA;
(2) that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue; and (3) that a third-party
claimant may not sue both the insured and the insurer in the same suit.
73
The supreme court agreed with the courts of appeal in Greenberg v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society74 and Shernoff v. Superior Court 7- that
section 790.09 creates a private cause of action for violation of the
UPA,76 and further held that an insurer's duty under the Act runs to
claimants as well as insureds.77 Thus, a third-party claimant could sue
an insurer for any violations of section 790.03 committed by the insurer
during the claims-settlement process.78 The court further held that the
phrase from Insurance Code'section 790.03(h), "[k]nowingly committing
or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general business prac-
tice," 79 allowed a statutory bad faith action for single acts of bad faith
65. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
66. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 941-42, 553 P.2d 584, 586-87, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 424, 426-27 (1976).
67. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
'68. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 331, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
69. Id., 592 P.2d at 331-32, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 844-45.
70. Id., 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
71. Id.; see CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
72. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845; see CAL. INS.
CODE § 790.03(h)(14) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
73. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
74. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
75. 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975).
76. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 885-86, 592 P.2d at 332-33, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46.
77. Id. at 890, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
78. Id.
79. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h).
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that were knowingly committed by the insurer.8 0
The Royal Globe court did agree with the insurers' contention that a
claimant may not sue both the insured and the insurer in the same ac-
tion.81 The court, in its desire to avoid prejudicing the defense of the
insured, 2 held that "the third party's suit may not be brought until the
action between the injured party and the insured is concluded." 3
The Royal Globe decision stood undisturbed for a decade.
III. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies
A. The Facts
In Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos.,8 4 the plaintiff,
Parvaneh Moradi-Shalal (Moradi-Shalal), sued Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Companies (Fireman's) after having settled her personal injury
suit 5 against Fireman's insured. 6 As part of the settlement agreement,
the personal injury suit against the insured had been dismissed with prej-
udice.87 Moradi-Shalal based her complaint against Fireman's on alleged
violations of section 790.03, subdivisions (h)(2), (3), and (5).88 Specifi-
cally, Moradi-Shalal alleged that Fireman's total failure to respond to her
attorney's two requests for settlement after the accident 9 constituted bad
faith within the meaning of section 790.03.90
The plaintiff's complaint, which sought both compensatory and pu-
80. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 892, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
83. Id. at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
84. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
85. Id. at 293, 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118. Plaintiff's suit against defendant's
insured arose out of an auto accident in which defendant's insured negligently collided with
plaintiff. Id.
86. Id. at 292-93, 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(2),(3),(5) (West Supp. 1989). See also supra note
2 for the complete text of section 790.03(h).
89. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 293, 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118-19. The auto
accident with Fireman's insured occurred in July of 1983. Id., 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr.
at 118. Plaintiff's attorney wrote Fireman's in April 1984 requesting settlement of plaintiff's
claim against Fireman's insured on the basis of evidence enclosed in the letter. Id. Plaintiff's
attorney again tried to obtain some response to the settlement request with another letter to
Fireman's dated June 6, 1984. Id. Having received no acknowledgment of either request,
plaintiff fied suit against Fireman's insured on June 21, 1984. Id. Plaintiff's suit against Fire-
man's insured was settled in September 1984. Id. Plaintiff then brought her Royal Globe bad
faith action against Fireman's. Id.
90. Id., 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118-19. Plaintiff's specific allegations were that
Fireman's "did not acknowledge or act upon [her attorneys'] communication, did not
promptly investigate or process the claim, and did not attempt in good faith to effectuate a
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nitive damages, was dismissed without leave to amend when the trial
court sustained Fireman's general demurrer.9 The trial court sustained
Fireman's demurrer on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to obtain
a final judicial determination of the insured's liability.92 The California
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a settlement followed by a dismis-
sal with prejudice sufficiently concludes a lawsuit against an insured to
allow a claimant to bring a Royal Globe action against the insurer.
93
The California Supreme Court originally granted review in order to
resolve whether the insured's liability must be judicially established
before a third-party Royal Globe action may be brought. 94 However, the
court went beyond this original purpose and considered the continuing
viability of the Royal Globe precedent as a whole. 95
B. Reasoning of the Court
1. The majority opinion
On appeal, with Chief Justice Lucas writing for the majority, the
court in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos.96 began its
analysis by reconsidering the validity of Royal Globe Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court.97 The court focused its attention on Royal Globe's inter-
pretation of Insurance Code sections 790.03 and 790.09 as creating a pri-
vate right of action allowing both insureds and third-party claimants to
sue for the bad faith acts prohibited by the Unfair Practices Act
(UPA).9' The Moradi-Shalal court summarized in three paragraphs the
majority opinion in Royal Globe99 and followed this with a lengthy in-
depth summary of Justice Richardson's dissent in Royal Globe."
prompt, fair and equitable settlement of the claim, in which liability was reasonably clear."
Id., 758 P.2d at 60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id., 758 P.2d at 61, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
94. Id. at 292, 758 P.2d at 59-60, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
95. Id.
96. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
97. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
98. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 294, 758 P.2d at 61, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 119 (citing Royal
Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979)).
99. Id. See supra notes 65-83 and accompanying text for a summary of the Royal Globe
opinion.
100. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 294-96, 758 P.2d at 61-62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 119-20. In
this summary of the two opinions in Royal Globe, Chief Justice Lucas chose to focus the
majority of his attention on the dissent. The Chief Justice devoted twice as much ink to a
dissent roughly half as long as the majority opinion.
In his dissenting opinion in Royal Globe, Justice Richardson criticized the majority's deci-
sion to allow private litigants to sue under the Unfair Practices Act as being both "gratuitous"
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a. stare decisis
The court next addressed some "well established principles gov-
erning the respect [the court] confer[s] upon [its own] prior opin-
ions...." 101 First, "prior applicable precedent usually must be followed
even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by
the current justices."' 0 2 The court acknowledged the valuable role stare
decisis plays in maintaining the predictability of the law so as to allow
society to act "with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of
law."
103
The court stated that this desire for stability in the law must be bal-
anced with the need for flexibility to correct past judicial errors.1" The
ability to correct past errors, the court continued, is particularly valuable
when the mistakes are tied to a matter of continuing public concern or
when subsequent developments demonstrate either the impropriety of an
earlier judgment or its ripeness for reconsideration. 105
Having carved out these discretionary exceptions to the general rule
of stare decisis, the court turned its attention to an analysis of develop-
ments occurring after the Royal Globe decision.1" 6 The court concluded
that in light of subsequent events it was necessary to overrule Royal
Globe.10
7
b. subsequent developments
i. rejection by other states
The first development listed by the Moradi-Shalal court as indica-
tive of Royal Globe's unsound reasoning was that other states' courts re-
and "wholly inconsistent . . . with a fair and reasoned analysis of [sections 790.03 and
790.09]." Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 898, 592 P.2d at 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 854 (Richardson,
J., dissenting).
101. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
102. Id.
103. Id., 758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (quoting 9 WrrKIN, CAL. PROCEDURE,
Appeal, § 758, at 726 (3d ed. 1985)).
104. Id., 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
105. Id. at 296-97, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (citing People v. Anderson, 43 Cal.
3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987)). The court also cited Monell v. New York
City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978), for the proposition that stare decisis
should not automatically bar overruling prior interpretations of statutes. Moradi-Shalal, 46
Cal. 3d at 296-97, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
106. Id. at 297-304, 758 P.2d at 63-68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121-26.
107. Id. at 296-97, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. The court also asserted that not
overturning Royal Globe would result in further "inequitable results, costly multiple litigation,
and unnecessary confusion .... ." Id.
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fused to follow the Royal Globe rule.1 8 The court found this significant
because the UPA, which includes Insurance Code sections 790.03 and
790.09, was derived from the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners' Model Act, which has been codified by 48 states.109 The
court observed that, of the 19 states having considered the issue, only two
other than California hold their versions of section 790.03 to create a
private right of action. 110
The court offered Morris v. American Family Mutual Insurance
Co.,"' a Minnesota decision, as representative of the way other states
have interpreted statutes patterned after the Model Act.l 2 The Morris
court had rejected the notion that the Model Act was intended to create
anything other than an administrative remedy.1 13 The Moradi-Shalal
court noted that California's UPA differed in some respects from the
statutes in those states whose decisions it cited, but maintained that any
108. Id.
109. Id. See supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Unfair Prac-
tices Act.
110. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297-98, 758 P.2d at 63-64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22. The
court cited the following cases as having "expressly acknowledged, but declined to follow,
Royal Globe": A & E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669 (4th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987) (applying Virginia law); Earth Scientists v. United
States Fidelity & Guar., 619 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Kan. 1985); Tweet v. Webster, 610 F. Supp.
104 (D. Nev. 1985); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986);
Scroggins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 393 N.E.2d 718 (1979); Seeman v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1982); Patterson v. Globe American Casualty Co., 101
N.M. 541, 685 P.2d 396 (1984); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56,
307 N.W. 2d 256 (1981). Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297 & n.4, 758 P.2d at 63 & n.4, 250
Cal. Rptr. at 121-22 & n.4.
The Moradi-Shalal court cited the following cases as implicitly rejecting Royal Globe:
Young v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 139 Mich. App. 600, 362 N.W.2d 844 (1984); Morris v.
American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire
Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 284
Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978); D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins, Co., 494
Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966 (1981); Swinton v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 283 S.C. 11, 320 S.E.2d 495
(1984); Russel v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Wilder v.
Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309 (1981); Tank v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 38 Wash. App. 438, 686 P.2d 1127 (1984). Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297-98
& n.5, 758 P.2d at 63-64 & n.5, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122 & n.5.
The Moradi-Shalal court also noted that even those two states that agreed with Royal
Globe as to the existence of a private statutory bad faith right of action were unwilling to hold
a single transgression as sufficient grounds for awarding damages. Id. at 297-98 & n.6, 758
P.2d at 64 & n.6, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122 & n.6 (citing Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247, 253, 658
P.2d 1065, 1068 (1983) and Jenkins v. J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co., 167 W. Va. 597, 610,280
S.E.2d 252, 259-60 (1981)).
111. 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986).
112. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122 (citing Morris
v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986)).
113. Morris, 386 N.W.2d at 235.
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differences were largely insignificant. 114 The court also acknowledged
that no out-of-state precedent is binding on California courts.1 15 How-
ever, the court viewed this "clear consensus" rejecting Royal Globe's in-
terpretation of a Model Act adopted by almost every state as a reason to
question the wisdom behind the Royal Globe decision. 6
I. unfavorable legal commentary
The second development the court saw as lending significant sup-
port to the reconsideration of Royal Globe was the existence of legal com-
mentary "generally critical of [Royal Globe]." 1 7 The court found the
"breadth of the criticism leveled at Royal Globe" by the several law re-
view articles "disturbing."' l  Likening the scholarly criticism to the pre-
viously mentioned out-of-state precedents, like Morris, the court found
cause to reconsider the correctness of Royal Globe's interpretation of the
UPA. 119
iii. the 1980 NAIC report
The next development that the court claimed required the overturn-
ing of Royal Globe was a 1980 report by the National Association of
114. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 298-99, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122-23. The court cited the following
articles: Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J.
833 (1982); Price, Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court: Right to Direct Suit Against
an Insurer by a Third Party Claimant, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1161 (1980); Note, Extending the
Liability of Insurers for Bad Faith Acts: Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 7 PEP-
PERDiNE L. REv. 777 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Extending the Liability of Insurers]; Note, Bad
Faith: Defining Applicable Standards in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 917 (1983); Note, Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies,
Inc.: An Illustration of the Problems Inherent in the Royal Globe Doctrine, 15 Sw. U.L. REv.
371 (1985); Comment, Liability to Third Parties for Economic Injury: Privity as a Useful
Animal, or a Blind Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. 87 (1981); Comment, Liability
Insurers and Third-Party Claimants" The Limits of Duty, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 125 (1981). The
court generalized these articles as
emphasiz[ing] both the erroneous nature of our holding (i.e., the strained interpreta-
tion of the statutory provisions, and the misreading or disregard of available legisla-
tive history) and the undesirable social and economic effects of the decision (i.e.,
multiple litigation, unwarranted bad faith claims, coercive settlements, excessive jury
awards, and escalating insurance, legal and other "transaction" costs).
Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. See infra notes 250-60
and accompanying text for a discussion of the contents of several of the articles cited by the
court.
118. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
119. Id. at 299, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).1 20 The court believed that the report
was relevant because it contained statements indicating that the drafters
of the Model Act provision upon which section 790.09 was based in-
tended that private parties could not bring actions against insurers. 121
iv. "additional" and "subsequent" legislative history
The court also considered what it labeled "additional legislative his-
tory" presented by a law review article.1 22 The court focused on the Cal-
ifornia Legislative Analyst's Report and the Legislative Counsel's
Digest.123 Both documents, submitted to the Legislature along with sec-
tion 790.03, described the statute as providing the Insurance Commis-
sioner only with an administrative remedial power.1 24 The court noted
that a private right of action against insurers was not mentioned in either
legislative report. 2 The court found that these reports indicated that
the Legislature did not intend to create a private remedy when it enacted
section 790.03.126
The court coupled this "additional legislative history" with what it
deemed "'subsequent' legislative history." 127 The court accorded great
significance to the state Senate's having passed legislation that would
have expressly overruled Royal Globe almost immediately after the deci-
sion was handed down by the court. 128 The court found that the Senate's
passage of the bill, Senate Bill 483, indicated a legislative dissatisfaction
with Royal Globe's creation of a private right of action.
1 29
The plaintiff had argued that the Senate Bill 483's failure to pass the
Ways and Means Committee of the State Assembly constituted a legisla-
120. Id. (citing Ratchford, Regarding a Private Right of Action Under Section 4(9) of the
NAIC Model Unfair Trade Practices Act, 2 NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS PROCEEDINGS 344
(1980)).
121. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 299, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. The court
seems to have assumed that by determining the intent of the NAIC it would also determine the
intent of the California Legislature.
122. Id. at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123. The court cited Price, supra note 117
at 1178-79.
123. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (citing PIER-
SON, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 459 (Apr. 28, 1972); LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST TO
A.B. 459 (1972)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id., 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24. The proposed legislation referred to by
the court is Senate Bill 483 and was presented to the legislature in May of 1979. Cal. S.B. 483
(1979) (as amended).
129. Id., 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
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tive rejection of bill 483.130 The court rejected this argument for two
reasons. First, the court maintained that the bill's failure in the Assem-
bly was not "determinative of the intent of the Assembly as a whole."''
Second, the majority asserted that a legislative rejection of Senate Bill
483 could not be deemed an acceptance of Royal Globe.'32 However, the
court added that " '[u]npassed bills, as evidences of legislative intent,
have little value.' ,133
The court also refuted the plaintiff's argument that the legislative
amendment of section 790.03(h) in 1983, without mentioning Royal
Globe, indicated a legislative acquiescence with that opinion.13 4 The jus-
tices stated that a court may freely reexamine and overturn a prior statu-
tory interpretation unless the Legislature either expressly or impliedly
adopts the holding of a particular case.135 The court concluded its dis-
cussion of subsequent "history" by asserting that such legislative equivo-
cation cast "considerable doubt" on the accuracy of the Royal Globe
court's perception of legislative intent when it interpreted section 790.03
to contain a private right of action.'36
v. adverse effects of the Royal Globe decision
The court then returned to the legal commentary it had previously
analyzed, 137 using it to document the adverse effects that Royal Globe
had imposed upon society. 138  Among these effects mentioned by the
court were multiple litigation, 39 unwarranted or inflated settlements,"4
130. Id., 758 P.2d at 65-66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (quoting Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379,
1396, 743 P.2d 1323, 1333, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 76 (1987)).
134. Id. at 300-01, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124. Plaintiff offered as authority in
support of her argument Estate of McDill, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837-38, 537 P.2d 874, 878, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 754, 758 (1975). Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300-01, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
124.
135. Id. at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (citing Cianci v. Superior Court, 40
Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985)). The court relied on Cianci for the rule
that legislative silence on an issue cannot be viewed as implied legislation. Id. at 300-01, 758
P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
136. Id.
137. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
138. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301-03, 758 P.2d at 66-67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25. The
court relied on these texts even though it admitted that it was not "in a position to verify the
accuracy of each of their observations." Id. at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
139. Id. The court stated that by creating a private right of action against insurers, Royal
Globe provided for a second law suit against the insurer for its violations of the Insurance Code
in addition to the initial determination of the insured's liability. Id.
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increased insurance costs to society,141 drained judicial resources, 142 con-
flicting interests imposed on insurers, 143 and a group of practical
problems regarding the judicial administration of Royal Globe actions. 144
vi. analytical difficulties
The Moradi-Shalal court continued by examining the analytical
problems created by Royal Globe.1 4' The majority maintained that Cali-
fornia courts were having difficulty precisely defining the scope of Royal
Globe liability.1  The court pointed to the fact that twenty-five cases
involving Royal Globe issues were awaiting its review. 47 The court
stated that Moradi-Shalal was a typical example of the analytical
problems presented by third-party Royal Globe actions.1 48 The court em-
phasized that several courts of appeal had reached conflicting conclu-
sions concerning when an action against the insured is concluded for
Royal Globe purposes.' 49 The majority also noted the problem of defin-
ing how a plaintiff can prove that an insurer is conducting unfair prac-
tices with such frequency to indicate a "'general business practice.' ,10
The court acknowledged that such proof is not required under Royal
Globe,"5 ' but stated that this difficulty in proving a "pattern" of unfair
140. Id. The court asserted that the threat of a bad faith action would coerce larger or
unfounded settlements from insurers simply out of fear of such a suit. Id.
141. Id. The court, on the basis of several legal commentaries, noted the possibility that the
costs of increased litigation and inflated settlements would be passed on to society through
increased insurance rates. Id. at 301-02, 758 P.2d at 66-67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
142. Id. at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124. In support of this proposition the
court quoted Allen, supra note 117, at 851; Price, supra note 117, at 1186-87, and Note, Ex-
tending The Liability of Insurers, supra note 117, at 790-91. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301,
758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
143. Id. at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125. The court believed that the need for
the insurer to protect itself from a bad faith action by a claimant conflicted with the duty the
insurer owed its insured, thus disrupting the settlement process. Id.
144. Id. The court focused on the lack of specific standards and definitions governing the
pursuit of a Royal Globe action by a third-party claimant. Id. The court cited the Royal Globe
opinion as the primary cause of the confusion. Id. at 302-03, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
125.
145. Id. at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. A third-party claim involves a claim against the insured. W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE
& H. LEVINE, supra note 17, § 3.01. A first-party claim involves a claim by the insured
against its insurer (e.g., life or health insurance claims). Id.
149. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
150. Id., 758 P.2d at 67-68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)
(West 1972 & Supp. 1989)).
151. Id. Under Royal Globe, a single violation of the Unfair Practices Act knowingly com-
mitted was sufficient to support a third-party bad faith claim against an insurer. Royal Globe,
23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
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practices symbolized the Royal Globe court's error in creating a private
right of action under section 790.03.152
The court concluded that resolving the problems accompanying
Royal Globe would require a balancing of many competing interests.
1 1
3
The court decided that such an undertaking was best left to the Legisla-
ture.154 Since Royal Globe was the cause of all these analytical problems,
the court asserted that reconsideration of Royal Globe was the most effec-
tive judicial solution.15
5
c. The aggregate effect
The Moradi-Shalal court concluded its discussion of developments
subsequent to Royal Globe by finding that the combination of all of the
aforementioned factors 156 composed an "irrefutable" argument in favor
of overturning Royal Globe.'57 The court garnished its holding with a
warning that insurers need not feel free to ignore the proscriptions of
section 790.03(h), citing the specter of administrative enforcement of that
section by the Insurance Commissioner.158 The majority discounted the
lack of reported cases involving enforcement of section 790.03 by the
Commissioner, and would not assume that this meant the statute was not
being enforced. 5 9 The court also stressed that California courts still had
the power to hear civil suits against insurers based on common-law
causes of action,'6" and that some of those actions would allow for recov-
ery of punitive damages and prejudgment interest. 6 ' Additionally, the
court reminded the Legislature of its ability to create, should it choose to
do so, a private right of action under section 790.03. 162
152. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 303-04, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
155. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
156. See supra notes 108-55 and accompanying text.
157. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
158. Id., 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
159. Id. The court offered three alternatives that it thought made such an assumption im-
possible. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127. First, it was possible that none of
the Commissioner's enforcement actions had ever been appealed. Id. Second, any cases that
had been appealed may have gone unreported. Id. Finally, the Commissioner may have
thought administrative enforcement superfluous in light of the civil remedy created in Royal
Globe. Id.
160. Id. at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127. The traditional common-law
actions against insurers include fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. Ac-
tions for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing are also
available, but only to insureds. Id.
161. Id. at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
162. Id.
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2. Pending Royal Globe actions
a. prospective judgment
The court next turned to the problem of then-pending Royal Globe
cases. 1 63 The Moradi-Shalal court decided not to apply the general rule
of retroactivity of judgments"6 to its holding in fairness to the many
plaintiffs with pending Royal Globe actions. 161
b. defining a concluded action for Royal Globe purposes
The court then embarked on an examination of the standards gov-
erning recovery in the pending Royal Globe third-party claims.1 66 The
first standard set by the court in this examination was the definition of a
concluded action for Royal Globe purposes. 16 7 The specific issue was
"whether settlement of the third party's claim against the insured 'con-
cludes' the action within the meaning of Royal Globe," thus allowing a
claimant to bring a Royal Globe action against the insurer without having
to actually obtain a judgment of liability against the insured.1 68 Several
courts of appeal had concluded that a judgment against the insured must
be obtained before an insurer may be sued under Royal Globe.1 69 The
court of appeal in the case at bar, however, held that a settlement of the
claim against the insured was sufficiently conclusive to allow a Royal
Globe action.
170
The Moradi-Shalal court began by reexamining the reasons of the
Royal Globe court for not allowing a joint action by a third-party claim-
163. Id.
164. Id. The general rule of retroactivity given by the court is that "'a decision of a court
of supreme jurisdiction overruling a former decision is retrospective in its operation.... We
have recognized exceptions to that rule when considerations of fairness and public policy pre-
clude full retroactivity.'" Id. (quoting Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 151-52, 642
P.2d 1305, 1306-07, 181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 785-86 (1982)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. The court noted that Royal Globe had set a requirement that a bad faith claim
based on section 790.03 could only be brought after the underlying claim against the insured
was concluded, but failed to give a precise definition of what constituted a sufficient conclu-
sion. Id.
168. Id.
169. See, eg., Heninger v. Foremost Ins. Co., 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 221 Cal. Rptr. 303
(1985); Williams v. Transport Indem. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984);
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1982). See
infra notes 179 and 185 and accompanying text for the court's discussion of cases holding that
a judgment against the insured is a prerequisite to bringing a Royal Globe action against the
insurer.
170. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 201 Cal. App. 3d 1126, 1130, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 333, 336, rev'd, 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
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ant against both insured and insurer.17' The first reason is that such
joinder would result in a patent violation of California Evidence Code
section 1155.172 The admission of such evidence was viewed by the
Moradi-Shalal majority as highly prejudicial to both the insured" 3 and
the insurer.' 74
The second reason for not allowing a joint trial is the hindrance such
joinder may impose on the insured's defense against liability.17  Joinder
of the insurer and the insured would lead to prolonged, burdensome dis-
covery against the insurer. 176 The Moradi-Shalal court feared the possi-
bility that evidence prejudicial to the insured might be found as the result
of discovery against the insurer. 177 The court also asserted that any dam-
ages suffered by the claimant as a result of the insurer's bad faith can be
more accurately determined after the initial liability action has ended.
7 1
The court concluded that Royal Globe required a judicial determination
of the insured's liability in a separate action before any bad faith suit
could be brought against the insurer under section 790.03(h)(5) of the
Insurance Code.'
79
171. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 306, 758 P.2d at 69-70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-28.
172. Id.; see also Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-
50. Evidence Code section 1155 prohibits, for the purpose of establishing fault, admission of
evidence that a defendant is insured. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155 (West 1966). The Royal Globe
court viewed this as necessary to avoid prejudicing the insured defendant's case. Royal Globe,
23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 849-50.
173. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 306, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
174. Id. at 311-12, 758 P.2d at 73-74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32.
175. Id. at 306, 758 P.2d at 70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 128. The specific concern is the effect that
a claimant engaging in discovery against the insurer will have on the insured's ability to defend
itself against liability. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 311, 758 P.2d at 73, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131. The Moradi-Shalal court supported
its holding with a discussion of several lower court decisions supporting its view. Id. at 306,
758 P.2d at 70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 128. First, in Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co., the
California Court of Appeal relied principally on the indemnifying function of insurance con-
tracts to support the conclusion that no claim against an insurer existed until the liability of
the insured was established. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 959-60, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72. The
Moradi-Shalal court focused on Williams' rejection of the argument that in a section 790.03(h)
action an insurer's unfair practices are at issue, not the insured's liability. Moradi-Shalal, 46
Cal. 3d at 307, 758 P.2d at 70, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
The court also discussed Heninger v. Foremost Insurance Co., a case in which the court of
appeal relied on the indemnification principle, reasoning that allowing a bad faith action under
790.03 without first requiring a judicial determination would essentially turn the UPA into a
form of statutory liability without fault. 175 Cal. App. 3d at 834, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 305-06.
The court agreed with the conclusion in Heninger that there can be no insurer bad faith under
section 790.03 without a previous determination of the legal liability of the insured. Moradi-
Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 307, 758 P.2d at 70-71, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 128-29.
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The court disposed of the plaintiff's argument that section 790.03
liability revolved around the insurer's unfair practices, which is separate
from the liability of the insured.8 ° The court distinguished between the
insurer's statutory duty to refrain from unfair practices and the claim-
ant's right to recover for a breach of that duty under Royal Globe.'"
The court found the right to recover under Royal Globe comparable to
the right to recover for legal malpracticel' 2 -just as a plaintiff in a legal
malpractice suit must first prove that he or she would have prevailed in
the action giving rise to the malpractice action, a third-party claimant in
a Royal Globe action must establish his or her right to recover against the
insured before the Royal Globe suit may be brought. 8 '
The court next considered the plaintiff's contention that, even after
a settlement, a court could still determine whether the insured was actu-
ally liable to the claimant by incorporating the inquiry into the Royal
Globe action itself. 84 The court rejected the argument, holding that to
gain standing to bring a Royal Globe action, the claimant must first ob-
tain a final judgment against the insured.8'
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 307-08, 758 P.2d at 71, 250'Cal. Rptr. at 129.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 308, 758 P.2d at 71, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
185. Id. The court analyzed two lines of court of appeal cases in reaching its holding. The
first line of cases originated in Doser v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d 883, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 115 (1980). Doser and its progeny require a separate judicial determination of the in-
sured's liability before a Royal Globe action can be brought. Id. at 891, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 119;
see also Heninger, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 834, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05; Williams, 157 Cal. App.
3d at 959-60, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72; Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App.
3d 711, 713, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464, 465 (1982).
The second line of cases began with Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App.
3d 46, 90 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983). This line of cases does not require a separate determination of
the insured's liability prior to the Royal Globe action. Id. at 53, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 709; see also
Vega v. Western Employers Ins. Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 922, 926, 216 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595
(1985); Afuso v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 169 Cal. App. 3d 859, 863, 215 Cal. Rptr.
490, 493 (1985).
The court of appeal in Moradi-Shalal had relied on the Rodriguez line of cases when it
held that settlement, followed by a dismissal with prejudice of all claims against the insured,
sufciently concluded the action for Royal Globe purposes. Moradi-Shalal, 201 Cal. App. 3d
at 1130, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 336. The court of appeal maintained that the concerns that led the
Royal Globe court to forbid a claimant's joint action against both the insured and the insurer,
see supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text, did not exist when settlement protected the
insured form any of the prejudicial effects of joinder. Moradi-Shalal, 201 Cal. App. 3d at
1128-29, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 335. In reversing the court of appeal's decision, the supreme court
adopted the indemnification-based reasoning of the Doser line of cases, which requires a sepa-
rate judicial determination of the insured's liability as a prerequisite to a Royal Globe action.
Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 311, 758 P.2d at 73, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131. In rejecting the
Rodriguez line of cases, the supreme court expressly stated that even an admission of liability
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The court offered several justifications for its holding. First, the
Legislature's purpose in enacting section 790.03(h) was to encourage set-
tlements. 186 Permitting litigation beyond the settlement stage would run
counter to that purpose.1 17 Second, the court discussed "various other
legal and practical considerations" that it viewed as supporting the re-
quirement.1 "' The first consideration was the evidentiary conflict that
forbade the joinder of the two actions under Royal Globe.189 The court
regarded the jury's knowledge that the defendant was an insurer and that
there was an insurance policy involved as potentially prejudicing the in-
surer's case in violation of Evidence Code section 1155.190 The court
also viewed the admission of evidence of the settlement as similarly prej-
udicial and in violation of Evidence Code section 1152,191 which prohib-
its admitting evidence of settlement as proof of the settling party's
liability.192
The Moradi-Shalal court also reasoned that a Royal Globe action
following settlement denies parties the main benefit of their bargain, since
it would force the insurer and insured to litigate the issue they had at-
tempted to avoid when they settled the underlying liability claim.1 93 The
court characterized that scenario as a penalty against the insurer, and a
windfall for the claimant.19 4 The court also judged that permitting a
Royal Globe action after settlement would result in a conflict of interest
for the insurer. 195 The court admitted that section 790.03 created a duty
owed by the insurer to the claimant, but found that the indemnifying
purpose of the insurance contract outweighed this duty. 196 As a final
consideration, the court added that a settlement of the underlying liabil-
ity claim followed by a dismissal with prejudice arguably precludes litiga-
tion of the insured's liability under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
197
The court concluded by dismissing the plaintiff's claim against Fire-
man's because the plaintiff had failed to obtain the required final judg-
by the insured would not be a sufficient means of determining the insured's liability prior to the
Royal Globe action. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
191. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (West 1966 & Supp. 1989).
192. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 311-12, 758 P.2d at 73-74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
193. Id. at 312, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 312-13, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 132-33.
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ment against Fireman's insured prior to filing its Royal Globe action. 19
The court admitted that its "predetermination" requirement was flawed,
but saw it as the best rule in light of the competing interests accompany-
ing the surviving Royal Globe actions.1 99
3. Justice Mosk's dissent
Justice Mosk wrote a scathing dissent which he began by declaring
that the majority's ruling constituted a "'Royal Bonanza' for insurance
carriers, i.e., total immunity for unfair and deceptive practices commit-
ted on innocent claimants. ' ' 2°° Noting that the case at bar had been
granted review merely for the purpose of eliminating some of Royal
Globe's analytical difficulties, Justice Mosk stated that "[t]he insurance
industry asked for a loaf of bread. The majority, with remarkable mag-
nanimity, [gave] it the whole bakery."2 1
Justice Mosk went on to attack the majority's reasoning. First, he
described as "fatuous" the majority's assertion that the legislative intent
behind section 790.03 was limited to protecting insureds.2 °2 To empha-
size this point, Justice Mosk quoted all of those segments of section
790.03(h) omitted by the majority which expressly offered protection to
claimants as well as insureds.
203
198. Id. at 313, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 313-14, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk accused the majority of cowering in the face of
the fundamental issues needing resolution, stating:
In most cases, of course, it would make our task relatively uncomplicated if we could
evade interpreting the law with finality by simply changing the law. On the other
hand, making our job easier is no justification for totally destroying a cause of action
authorized by statute, approved by decisions of this court and of Courts of Appeal,
and acquiesced in by the Legislature for nearly a decade.
Id., 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 316, 758 P.2d at 76, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The majority
had only quoted the following segments of section 790.03:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance.
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a gen-
eral business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communica-
tions with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt inves-
tigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
i5)" 'Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable set-
tlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
203. Id. at 314-16, 758 P.2d at 76, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See supra
note 2 for the complete text of Insurance Code section 790.03(h).
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Justice Mosk took similar exception to the majority's finding that
section 790.03 requires a litigant to show that a particular violation of
790.03 is part of a pattern of unfair business practices.2° He thought it
unjust to forbid a claimant or insured from obtaining relief from a single
deceptive act that was knowingly committed, asserting that: "[W]hile
repetition of prohibited acts may be relevant to the duty of the Insurance
Commissioner to issue a cease and desist order, to an aggrieved private
litigant who can demonstrate that the insurer acted deliberately, the fre-
quency of the insurer's misconduct and its application to other victims
are irrelevant.
205
Justice Mosk's dissent reached a crescendo when he addressed the
majority's assertion that the Insurance Commissioner would provide ad-
equate protection for claimants by exercising the enforcement powers
granted the office under the Insurance Code.2 °6 Justice Mosk faulted the
majority for encouraging the Insurance Commissioner to "continue" to
enforce the law when in fact the court failed to show that the Commis-
sioner ever had.20 7
Justice Mosk next addressed the majority's contention that the
equivocations of the Legislature indicated its rejection of Royal Globe; to
the contrary, the dissenting justice regarded the death of Senate Bill
483208 as significant in "represent[ing] legislative approval of and confir-
mation of the Royal Globe decision."'2 'o Justice Mosk further argued
that by amending section 790.03 in 1983 without disturbing the Royal
Globe holding, the Legislature demonstrated its acquiescence in that
holding.210
Seeming somewhat resentful of the majority's "attempt to give an
impression that Royal Globe was some kind of aberration, wholly unprec-
204. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 316-17, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
205. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
206. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
207. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 317, 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). To support his assertion, Justice Mosk offered the facts that
[s]ince 1959 when [the Unfair Practices Act was] adopted, 62 volumes of California
Reports and 297 volumes of California Appellate Reports have been published. In
those 359 volumes there are more than 300,000 pages. On not one page of one vol-
ume is a single case reported in which the Insurance Commissioner has taken disci-
plinary action against a carrier for "unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the
business of insurance" involving a claimant. Not one case in 29 years.
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
208. See supra notes 122-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Senate Bill 483 and
the significance attributed to it by the majority.
209. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
210. Id., 758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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edented and unanticipated,"211 Justice Mosk, the author of Royal Globe,
noted that Royal Globe was the fourth in a series of cases holding that the
Unfair Practices Act provided a private right of action.212 Justice Mosk
concluded that "it is clear [when looking at these three prior cases] that
Royal Globe was preordained." '213 Justice Mosk perceived the majority's
holding as implicitly overruling these previous cases, as well as the Royal
Globe holding itself. 14
Justice Mosk also insinuated that the majority had fabricated the
overwhelming analytical difficulties it asserted as a reason for overruling
Royal Globe by stating that "Courts of Appeal have had remarkably little
difficulty in interpreting and applying [Royal Globe] as authority." '215
Moreover, Justice Mosk viewed with contempt the majority's reliance on
contrary out-of-state precedent to support its overruling Royal Globe,216
stating that: "California courts alone have the responsibility of interpret-
ing the laws adopted by the California Legislature, and they cannot be
deterred from that duty by what other states have done or failed to do
under laws enacted by their legislative bodies."2 7
Concluding his dissent, Justice Mosk reflected upon the irony that
the insurance industry, despite its political influence and public relations
machinery, was unable to convince the Legislature that Royal Globe
should be overruled, only to succeed "in persuading justices of this court
that [the industry] is entitled to immunity from the same type of respon-
sibility required of every other business and individual that commit de-
ceptive practices. ' 218  Justice Mosk asserted that the majority failed to
answer the question of "why [the insurance] industry is entitled to be
above the law that applies to every other segment of society," because the
question was beyond any rational answer.2 19
211. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 318-19, 758 P.2d at 78-79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Mosk cited Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 147
Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978), Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680
(1975), and Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr.
470 (1973), as three cases preceding Royal Globe in holding that the Unfair Practices Act
affords private litigants a right of action. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). See supra notes 49-64 and
accompanying text for a discussion of cases preceding Royal Globe.
213. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 319, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
214. Id. at 320, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
216. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
217. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at .320, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
218. Id., 758 P.2d at 79-80, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 321, 758 P.2d at 80, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos.22 0 majority's
overturning of Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court2 2 1 raises
many questions. The scope of this Note, however, is limited to two is-
sues. First, this section critiques the reasoning of the Moradi-Shalal
court and analyzes the opinion's treatment of the doctrine of stare deci-
sis. Second, it considers Moradi-Shalal's immediate and potential effects
on insurance bad faith litigation in California.
A. The Reasoning of the Moradi-Shaal Majority
1. The decision to overrule Royal Globe
In overruling Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court,22 2 the
majority in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos.22 3 stated
that negative subsequent developments-Royal Globe's rejection by other
state courts, adverse scholarly commentary and subsequent legislative
history-presented an "irrefutable" argument that Royal Globe should
be overruled.224 A closer look at these developments reveals that the
cited sources of doubt are not persuasive.
a rejection by other state courts
The Moradi-Shalal court found it significant that courts of seven-
teen states had considered their own versions of the NAIC Model Act
and had concluded that they did not create a private right of action.
225
The court cited seventeen out-of-state cases that it characterized as hav-
ing either expressly or implicitly rejected Royal Globe's interpretation of
the Model Act.2 26
The court, however, disregarded two important facts. First, only
eight of the seventeen out-of-state opinions cited by the court as rejecting
the Royal Globe holding were rendered by state supreme courts. 227 See-
220. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
221. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
222. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
223. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
224. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126. See supra notes 108-55 and accompa-
nying text for a summary of the court's treatment of these issues.
225. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297-98, 758 P.2d at 63-64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
226. Id. See supra note 110 for a complete list of the cases cited by the Moradi-Shalal
court.
227. Eg., White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986); Seeman v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1982); Morris v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d
576 (1978); Farris v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 284 Or. 453, 587 P.2d 1015 (1978);
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ond, two state supreme courts have approved Royal Globe.228 Thus,
three of the eleven state supreme courts-27%-that have considered
the issue have held that a statute based on the Model Act confers a pri-
vate right of action.229 This percentage of approving state supreme
courts certainly does not support the Moradi-Shalal majority's assertion
that Royal Globe has been rejected with "near unanimity" by other
states.230 Also, the Model Act was adopted, in one form or another, by
forty-eight states.231 With only eleven states having spoken with finality,
thirty-seven states remain undecided on the issue. This "rejection" of
Royal Globe by other state courts cannot even qualify as a majority rule.
An examination of the opinions cited by the Moradi-Shalal court
reveals that many of the out-of-state courts did not wholly "reject" Royal
Globe; rather they distinguished their state's version of the Unfair Prac-
tices Act from California's. For example, in Morris v. American Family
Mutual Insurance Co.,232 the Minnesota Supreme Court decision deemed
"typical of the majority approach" by the Moradi-Shalal court,233 made
mention of the "unique" language in California's Unfair Practices Act
(UPA) that led to the Royal Globe decision.234
Other cases mentioned by the Moradi-Shalal court also distin-
guished their states' Unfair Practices Act, but with more vigor than the
Minnesota court.235 Comparing Wisconsin's version of the NAIC Model
Act with California Insurance Code section 790.09,236 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court found "no analogous provision in [Wisconsin's] insur-
ance laws."'2 37 The Wisconsin court also noted language in Wisconsin's
version23 of section 790.03 which expressly requires that an insurer com-
mit an unfair practice both "without just cause and.., with such fre-
quency as to indicate a general business practice.12 39
D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966 (1981);
Wilder v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 140 Vt. 16, 433 A.2d 309 (1981); Kranzush v.
Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256 (1981).
228. See Klaudt v. Flink, 202 Mont. 247, 658 P.2d 1065 (1983); Jenkins v. J.C. Penney
Casualty Ins. Co., 167 W. Va. 597, 280 S.E.2d 252 (1981).
229. See Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845; Klaudt, 202
Mont. at 252, 658 P.2d at 1067; Jenkins, 167 W. Va. 607, 280 S.E.2d at 258.
230. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
231. Id. at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
232. 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986).
233. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
234. Morris, 386 N.W.2d at 237 n.6.
235. See, eg., Seeman, 322 N.W.2d at 42; Kranzush, 103 Wis. 2d at 82, 307 N.W.2d at 269.
236. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972).
237. Kranzush, 103 Wis. 2d at 82, 307 N.W.2d at 269.
238. Wis. ADMIN. CODE, Ins. § 6.11(3)(a) (Mar. 1979).
239. Kranzush, 103 Wis. 2d at 80, 307 N.W.2d at 269 (quoting Wis. ADMIN. CODE, Ins.
1292 [Vol. 22:1267
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Another example of a state court distinguishing its statute from Cal-
ifornia's is Seeman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.2" In Seeman, the
Iowa Supreme Court distinguished Iowa's Unfair Practices Act from
California's.24 1 The court concluded that the difference in language
evinced a legislative intent not to create a private cause of action, unlike
the language in California's Act. 2 However, the Seeman court also
stated:
Were it not for our conclusion that the legislature intended ad-
ministrative sanctions to be the exclusive enforcement mecha-
nism enforcing [the Unfair Practices Act], we believe a private
cause of action would be consistent with the underlying pur-
poses of the Act. An action for money damages provides an
injured party with a meaningful incentive to seek enforcement
of the chapter's prohibitions and also provides a meaningful de-
terrent against future violations.2 43
Thus, these out-of-state cases cited by the Moradi-Shalal court as inter-
preting their states' UPA did not "reject" Royal Globe so much as deter-
mine that their legislatures intended something less than did the
California Legislature. 2"
Another weakness in the cases cited by the Moradi-Shalal court is
that several are from jurisdictions that, at most, recognize only a contrac-
§ 6.11(3)(a) (Mar. 1979)). Section 790.03 provides "[k]nowingly committing or performing
with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice . . . ." CAL. INS. CODE
§ 790.03(h) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989). In Earth Scientists v. United States Fidelity and
Guar., 619 F. Supp. 1465, 1470-71 (D. Kan. 1985), the federal district court for the district of
Kansas also distinguished the language in Kansas' Unfair Practices Act from California's sec-
tion 790.09. Accord A & E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 669, 675
n.6 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987); Seeman, 322 N.W.2d at 42; Patterson v.
Globe American Casualty Co., 101 N.M. 541, 543, 685 P.2d 396, 397 (1984).
240. 322 N.W.2d 35 (Iowa 1982).
241. Id. at 42.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 43.
244. Moreover, one of the cases cited by the Moradi-Shalal court did not in any way ad-
dress Royal Globe nor interpret an adopted version of the NAIC Model Act. Tweet v. Web-
ster, 610 F. Supp. 104 (D. Nev. 1985), makes no mention of the Nevada Unfair Practices
statute but merely refers to State ex reL Allen v. District Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999
(1952), to support its blanket assertion that "[w]hile California recognizes the existence of a
statutory duty to negotiate settlements in good faith... Nevada does not." The only issue in
Allen was whether claimants could use the discovery process to ascertain the coverage limits of
an insurance policy; it had nothing to do with insurer bad faith and focused only on perpetua-
tion-of-testimony statutes. 69 Nev. at 198, 245 P.2d at 1001. Further, the most recent statute
considered in Allen was passed in 1929. Id. The Model Act was not even drafted until 1947.
AN ACT RELATING TO UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
AcTs AND PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE, reprinted in 2 NAT'L ASS'N INS.
COMM'RS PROCEEDINGS 392 (1947).
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tual action for bad faith failure to settle within policy limits.2 4 One cited
jurisdiction has only recently begun to recognize bad faith actions against
246insurers. It would be quite a leap for a court of such a jurisdiction to
elevate an action limited by privity to an implied statutory action ex-
tending protection to third-party claimants. Even the progressive Cali-
fornia courts took the intermediate step of recognizing that an insurer's
bad faith sounds in tort as well as contract.247
Moreover, as Justice Mosk noted, the cases cited by the majority
were legally irrelevant: "California courts alone have the responsibility
of interpreting the law adopted by the California Legislature, and they
cannot be deterred from that duty by what other states have done or
failed to do under [their own] laws . ,, .I As demonstrated above,
every state's version of the Model Act differs in some way from the Cali-
fornia statute.24 9 Each state legislature and court system faces problems
unique to that state, and consequently, promulgates or interprets laws in
conformity with those concerns. That a Minnesota court found a pur-
pose behind a Minnesota statute different from that found by a California
court behind a California statute is not surprising-it should be expected.
b. adverse scholarly commentary
The Moradi-Shalal court asserted that "[c]ommentary on Royal
Globe has been generally critical of that decision." 250 The court cited
seven articles which it painted as:
[E]mphasiz[ing] both the erroneous nature of our holding (i.e.,
the strained interpretation of the statutory provisions, and the
misreading or disregard of available legislative history) and the
undesirable social and economic effects of the decision (i.e.,
multiple litigation, unwarranted bad faith claims, coercive set-
tlements, excessive jury awards, and escalating insurance, legal
and other "transaction" costs).
25 '
245. Earth Scientists, 619 F. Supp. at 1469; Lawton, 118 N.H. at 613-14, 392 A.2d at 580-
81; Morris, 386 N.W.2d at 237; Swinton, 283 S.C. 11, 14, 320 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1984).
246. Young v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 139 Mich. App. 600, 607 & n.1, 362 N.W.2d 844,
847 & n.1 (1984).
247. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
See supra notes 8-83 and accompanying text for a summary of California's evolving insurance
bad faith laws.
248. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 320, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 138 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
249. See supra notes 232-44 and accompanying text.
250. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122. See sources
cited supra note 117.
251. Id. at 299, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
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The court considered this "breadth of criticism" disturbing enough to
warrant reconsideration of Royal Globe.252
The court overgeneralized the character and content of the author-
ity it cited. Of the seven articles, six admittedly are critical of the reason-
ing of the Royal Globe court.253 Only two of the articles cited, however,
assert that any negative effects have in fact resulted from Royal Globe,254
while the rest merely speculate. Even those claiming that Royal Globe
has actually resulted in adverse effects upon society fail to cite any empir-
ical evidence to substantiate their assertions.2 55 Thus, the tidal wave of
scholarly criticism which the majority represents to exist barely qualifies
as a flood tide.
Moreover, there are articles which came to praise Royal Globe, and
not to bury it, which the court fails to mention.25 6 One of these arti-
cles257 is among the seven cited by the Moradi-Shalal court as being de-
rogatory; yet most of its analysis focuses on the positive ramifications of
Royal Globe and ultimately concludes that the decision furthered Califor-
nia public policy. 258 All told, there are six pieces of legal commentary
that view Royal Globe as a step in the right direction toward protecting
society from capricious acts of insurers.259 In light of this balance of
legal commentary in favor of Royal Globe, Chief Justice Lucas' assertion
that commentary regarding Royal Globe has been generally negative26' is
incorrect.
252. Id., 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
253. The article that is not critical of Royal Globe is Note, Extending The Liability of Insur-
ers, supra note 117. The Note does not critique Royal Globe's reasoning, but focuses on its
possible ramifications, both positive and negative.
254. See Note, Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Inc.: An Illustration of
the Problems Inherent in the Royal Globe Doctrine, 15 Sw. U.L. REv. 371 (1985); Comment,
Bad Faith: Defining Applicable Standards in the Aftermath of Royal Globe v. Superior Court,
23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 917 (1983).
255. The only subsequent "adverse" development which is actually documented is the
number of Royal Globe actions pending review before the California Supreme Court. Moradi-
Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
256. See Aitken & Abeltin, When Does "The Fat Lady Sing" For Purposes of a Royal Globe
Action? Endless Litigation Over What Does or Should Constitute the Resolution of a Claim, 14
W. ST. U. L. REv. 55 (1986); Beck & Horwitz, Insurer's Day In Court: New Limits On Royal
Globe, 8 L.A. LAW. 31 (May 1985); Lambert, Tom on Torts, 23 AM. TRIAL LAWS. Ass'N L.
RPTR. 338, 342-43 (1980); Shernoff, Insurance Company Bad Faith Law: A Potential Weapon
For Consumer Protection, 17 TRIAL 22 (May 1981); Comment, A Statutory Action For Insurer
Bad Faith-The Reasonably Clear Remedy for the Third Party Claimant, 11 PAC. L.J. 945
(1980) [hereinafter Comment, A Statutory Action For Insurer Bad Faith].
257. Note, Extending the Liability of Insurers, supra note 117.
258. Id. at 788-89, 791.
259. See sources cited supra notes 256-57.
260. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 298, 758 P.2d at 64, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
June 1989] 1295
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
c. "additional" and "subsequent" legislative history
i. additional legislative history
The Moradi-Shalal majority implied that perhaps not all of Insur-
ance Code section 790.03's legislative history was considered by the
Royal Globe court.261 The Moradi-Shalal court stated that certain docu-
ments, discussed by a legal commentator,262 were not mentioned in either
the majority or dissenting Royal Globe opinions.263 Specifically, the
Moradi-Shalal court was concerned with the Legislative Analyst's Re-
port and the Legislative Counsel's Digest-two pieces of extrinsic legisla-
tive history that allegedly show that section 790.03 was to provide only
administrative remedies.2 4 However, a careful reading of the legal com-
mentary,265 and the Royal Globe majority opinion reveals that the court
did consider both the Report and the Digest, but adjudged them "too
general or remote to provide any firm guidance. '266 Thus, the Moradi-
Shalal court fabricated an evidentiary controversy where none existed,
using the opportunity to reevaluate evidence that had already been con-
sidered by the Royal Globe court. The court also failed to reconsider all
of the evidence examined by the Royal Globe court.2 67 The Moradi-
Shalal court therefore speciously analyzed the evidence of legislative in-
tent: It mocked stare decisis, which it so carefully espoused early in the
opinion, 268 and it selectively evaluated the evidence, analyzing only those
261. Id. at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
262. See Price, supra note 117, at 1178-79.
263. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
264. Id.
265. Price, supra note 117, at 1178-79.
266. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 887, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
267. For example, the Royal Globe court examined the reasoning in Homestead Supplies,
Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 992, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22, 30 (1978), Shernoff
v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 409-10, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680, 682 (1975), and Greenberg
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470, 475 (1973),
three cases preceding Royal Globe and holding that Insurance Code section 790.03 creates a
private right of action. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 885-87, 592 P.2d at 333, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
846. The Moradi-Shalal court made no such examination, merely mentioning those cases in its
summary of Justice Richardson's dissent in Royal Globe. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 295,
758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 120. Other pieces of evidence presented to and evaluated by
the Royal Globe court include letters from former insurance commissioner Barger and Assem-
blyman Pierson, sponsor of the 1971 amendment to the Unfair Practices Act, testimony given
by a Department of Insurance representative to "various legislative committees," and a "'Bill
Analysis"' by the Department of Insurance. Royal Globe, 23 Cal. 3d at 887-89, 592 P.2d at
333-35, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 846-48. None of these are even mentioned by the Moradi-Shalal
court.
268. The Moradi-Shalal court stated: "It is, of course, a fundamental jurisprudential policy
that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered
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items that would lead to an apparently preordained result.2 69
ii. subsequent legislative history
The Moradi-Shalal court's use of "subsequent" legislative history 270
should be forever remembered as one of the great self-contradictions in
the history of California jurisprudence. The court began by finding the
Senate's passage of Senate Bill Number 483271 indicative of a legislative
dissatisfaction with Royal Globe.272 However, the court then discounted
the argument that the failure of the bill to pass the Assembly constituted
an approval of Royal Globe by stating that "'[u]npassed bills, as evi-
dences of legislative intent, have little value.' "273
If the rule is that unpassed bills have little evidentiary value, that
rule must be applied consistently. Thus, the Senate's passage of Senate
Bill 483 has the same evidentiary value as the Assembly's failure to pass
it: zero. Conversely, if the history of unenacted bills does have eviden-
tiary value, then the checkered life of Senate Bill 483 at best represents a
legislative "wash."
Moreover, by according significance to a bill passed only by the Sen-
ate, the court ignored the bicameralism requirement of the California
Constitution.274 It is true that the bicameralism requirement is ad-
dressed only to the making of laws, not to legislative-intent analyses; but
to afford credibility to one house of the Legislature at the expense of the
other violates the spirit of the constitution.275
Satisfied that no one had noticed that the emperor had no clothes,
the majority next side-stepped the fact that the Legislature had expressly
modified section 790.03 in 1983 without disturbing subdivision (h) or the
anew, might be decided differently by the current justices." Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296,
758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
269. Id. at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
270. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24.
271. Senate Bill 483 would have expressly eliminated civil liability under California Insur-
ance Code section 790.03(h) and overruled Royal Globe. Cal. S.B. 483 (1979) (as amended).
272. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300-01, 758 P.2d at 65-66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24.
273. Id. at 300, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (quoting Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1396, 743 P.2d 1323, 1333, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67,
76 (1987)).
274. CAL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 8. Article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution
states that "[t]he legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which
consists of the Senate and the Assembly." Id. § 1 (emphasis added). Article IV, section 8(b)
states that "[t]he Legislature may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute
except by bill. No bill may be passed unless... a majority of the membership of each house
concurs." Id. § 8(b) (emphasis added).
275. See id. § 1.
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Royal Globe holding.2 7 6 The court deemed the Legislature's failure to
mention Royal Globe "mere silence" and stated that Cianci v. Superior
Court2 77 forbade such silent acquiescence278 from being" 'elevated into a
species of implied legislation'" which might prohibit review of Royal
Globe.279
Cianci is patently distinguishable from Moradi-Shalal. In Cianci,
the Legislature had not altered any portion of the statute in question after
its most recent judicial interpretation 2 8 ---truly "mere silence." In con-
trast, the Legislature after Royal Globe had fully reconsidered section
790.03, leaving subdivision (h) untouched.28' To equate the situations in
Cianci and Moradi-Shalal is to require the Legislature to expressly ratify
judicial constructions of statutes to preserve those constructions as
precedent.
Until Moradi-Shalal, the rule of interpretation was that if the Legis-
lature failed to change the law in a specific area, when the general subject
was before it and other changes were made, then the legislative intent
was to leave the law as it was in the areas not amended.28 2 This principle
was firmly established in Estate of Bannedee,28 3 Estate of McDill,28 4 Bai-
ley v. Superior Court,2'8 and People v. Olsen.2" 6 Justice Mosk, in his dis-
sent, asserted that the majority's attempt to avoid these precedents
"stands the concept of legislative intent on its head. ' 287  Under the
276. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 300-01, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
277. 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985).
278. Id. at 923, 710 P.2d at 386, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 586.
279. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124 (quoting Cianci
v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 922-23, 710 P.2d 375, 386, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 586 (1985)).
280. Cianei, 40 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 710 P.2d at 386, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 585-86.
281. 1972 Cal. Stat., ch. 725, § 1, 1134 (codified at CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1972
& Supp. 1989)).
282. Estate of McDill, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837-38, 537 P.2d 874, 878, 122 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758
(1975).
283. 21 Cal. 3d 527, 537, 580 P.2d 657, 662-63, 147 Cal. Rptr. 157, 162-63 (1978) (assump-
tion that Legislature amends statutes with present judicial interpretation in mind is generally
accepted principle).
284. 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837-38, 537 P.2d 874, 878, 122 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758 (1975) (Legisla-
ture's change of general area of law without disturbing prior interpretation indicates intent to
leave law as it stands).
285. 19 Cal. 3d 970, 977-78 n.10, 568 P.2d 394, 398 n.10, 140 Cal. Rptr. 669, 673 n.10
(1977) (failure to change law in specific area when general subject is reconsidered equivalent to
legislative satisfaction with present state of law).
286. 36 Cal. 3d 638, 647 n.19, 685 P.2d 52, 57 n.19, 205 Cal. Rptr. 492, 497 n.19 (1984)
(Legislature is assumed to be aware of existing law when passing a statute).
287. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 318, 758 P.2d at 78, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 136 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
1298
THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH ABOLISHED
Moradi-Shalal rule the Legislature is required to bestow on the courts a
legislative "'atta' boy!" to uphold their statutory interpretation.
The court's equivocal language in explaining the pertinent rules of
interpreting legislative intent reflects its self-contradictory analysis. The
court stated: "[T]he foregoing legislative history, although somewhat in-
conclusive, nonetheless casts considerable doubt upon the correctness of
Royal Globe's interpretation of legislative intent." '288 It would be difficult
to find a more evasive way of saying we now disagree with our previous
interpretation of legislative intent.
d. adverse consequences of Royal Globe
The Moradi-Shalal court asserted that Royal Globe was having a
substantial negative impact on society. 28 9 The court stated that the cost
of handling insurance claims increased because of Royal Globe, and that
the cost has been passed on to society through higher insurance premi-
ums.2 90 Even so, this cost must be balanced against Royal Globe's bene-
fits, which are not mentioned in the majority opinion. For example,
Royal Globe actions offer claimants protection from blatantly unfair in-
surer conduct, thereby compensating for the unequal bargaining powers
of the litigants.2 91 Legal commentators early recognized the need to pro-
tect third-party claimants.2 92 One commentator has stated: "Because
the victim [of the insured's negligence] has suffered a casualty loss ad-
versely affecting his financial position and must negotiate with the in-
surer, he is often in need of protection from the insurer's bad faith
conduct.
'293
It is recognized that insured first-party claimants can suffer real
harm as a result of an insurer's conduct.294 Common sense dictates that
288. Id. at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
289. Id. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text for a summary of the adverse ef-
fects the court saw as stemming from Royal Globe.
290. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301-02, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
291. Comment, Liability to Third Parties For Economic Injury: Pr'vity as a Useful Animal
or a Blind Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. U.L. REv. 87, 120 (1981).
292. See, e.g., Comment, A Statutory Action For Insurer Bad Faith, supra note 256, at 952;
Comment, Extending the Insurer's Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Third Parties Under
Liability Insurance Policies, 25 UCLA L. Rv. 1413 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Extending
the Insurer's Duty].
293. Comment, Extending the Insurer's Duty, supra note 292, at 1416.
294. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1974). In Silberg, the insurer's unwarranted refusal to pay a claimant's medical bills
resulted in damage to the claimant's credit reputation, a forced change of residence, reposses-
sion of the claimant's wheelchair, the claimant's inability to obtain pain medication and, ulti-
mately, a nervous breakdown. Id. at 457-60, 521 P.2d at 1106-08, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 714-16.
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such harm can also befall innocent third-party claimants.2 95 Public pol-
icy should dictate that an insurer be held liable for all damages proxi-
mately caused by its bad faith dealings with claimants.296
The commentator most heavily relied upon by the Moradi-Shalal
court,2 9 7 a student, recognized no injury to claimants resulting from an
insurer's conduct, stating that "the claimant cannot be harmed by the
actions of the insurance company. ' 298 The rationale for this argument is
that there is no privity of contract between the injured claimant and the
insurer.299 The commentator failed to recognize that privity is merely a
label used to characterize certain legal relationships." ° Whether parties
are in privity has no bearing on the very real harm that can be inflicted
on third parties by an insurer's bad faith. Consider the case of an auto-
mobile accident victim who is severely injured by an insured's negligence.
The victim will often be placed in a precarious financial position if the
insurer does not timely pay the victim's claim.3"1 The victim could suffer
damage to his or her credit reputation, emotional distress and have difli-
culty paying medical bills or even obtaining needed medical treatment. 30 2
Such injuries do not depend on the presence of privity.
Another benefit of Royal Globe that flows both to insureds and
third-party claimants is that Royal Globe has forced insurers to actually
investigate a claim before declining to either pay or negotiate a settle-
ment.30 3 Under Royal Globe, the insurer's attorneys and other claims
management personnel must thoroughly investigate a claim and take
only actions that are reasonably consistent with the results of that
investigation."°
295. See Comment, Extending the Insurer's Duty, supra note 292, at 1416. "lAin insurer's
obligation to pay on a liability policy is triggered by the insured's injuring a third party ....
Because the victim has suffered a casualty loss adversely affecting his financial position and
must negotiate with the insurer, he is often in need of protection from the insurer's bad faith
conduct." Id.
296. Ryan, The Bad Faith Blast, 28 FOR THE DEF. 20, 22 (Mar. 1986).
297. Price, supra note 117.
298. Id. at 1176.
299. Id.
300. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Corp., 217 N.Y. 382, 385, 111 N.E. 1050, 1051
(1916).
301. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
303. Knepper, Review of Recent Tort Trends, 30 DEF. L. J. 1, 24 (1981).
304. In the words of one commentator:
In short, attorneys, claims managers, litigation supervisors and adjusters are now
forced to get away from the old "gut" reaction or "smell" test in the handling of
claims and suits. If the investigative report does not contain facts which constitute a
reasonable basis for denial of a claim, the insurer will be compelled to proceed with
the adjustment and settlement of the claim. Otherwise, the company may face the
[Vol. 22:1267
THIRD-PARTY BAD FAITH ABOLISHED
Finally, the Moradi-Shalal court viewed as an "unfortunate conse-
quence" that Royal Globe created a conflict of interest between an in-
surer's contractual duty to protect its insured's interest and the insurer's
right to protect itself from statutory bad faith liability to claimants. 05
This "conflict of interest," however, can easily be eliminated by the in-
surer. By responsibly investigating claims and declining to pay or settle
claims only where there exists a rational basis for doing so, the insurer
both fulfills its contractual duty to its insured and avoids any grounds for
bad faith liability.3" 6 Essentially, if an insurer does not violate the Unfair
Practices Act, it cannot be liable to anyone.30 7
Moreover, under present law, this "conflict of interest" is illusory.
In Bogard v. Employers Casualty Co.,308 the court of appeal held that the
insured has no cause of action against the insurer for breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if the insurer settles a claim
with a third party, even if the insurer did not adequately investigate the
true value of the claim.3" 9 While it is possible that such a settlement
might technically breach the contractual duty to defend, it would be a
rare occasion where the interest of the insured lay in costly litigation
rather than in the reasonable settlement counseled by the insurer.310
Also, where such a conflict of interest does arise, the insurer's contrac-
tual duty to defend requires the insurer not only to inform the insured of
the conflict,311 but also to provide independent counsel who will protect
the interests of the insured.312 Thus, an insurer who is willing to reason-
consequences of exposure far above and apart that underwritten by the policy of
insurance.
Fanning, Bad Faith and Other Extra-Contractual Actions Against Insurers, 27 FOR THE DEF.
11, 17 (Nov. 1985).
305. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
306. Comment, A Statutory Action For Insurer Bad Faith, supra note 256, at 952-53.
307. This, of course, assumes that the jury will be objective and that the claimant will act
with good faith during the settlement negotiations. This is not always the case. See, eg.,
White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 900, 710 P.2d 309, 327, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509,
527 (1985) (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting) (third-party claimants often attempt to trap
insurers into committing bad faith violations).
308. 164 Cal. App. 3d 602, 210 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
309. Id. at 615, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 586-87. The court did not hold that the insurer, under
similar facts, would never face liability for breach of its contractual duty to defend. Id.
310. "Obviously, it will always be in the insured's interest to settle within the policy limits
when there is any danger, however slight, of a judgment in excess of those limits." Crisci v.
Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430,426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967) (emphasis
added).
311. Bogard, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 611, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
312. See Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 647-48, 394 P.2d 571, 574-
77, 39 Cal. Rptr. 731, 736-37 (1964); San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Co.,
162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 371, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 503 (1984); Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 157
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ably negotiate a settlement offer within the policy limits can avoid liabil-
ity to its insured by informing the insured of the conflict and providing
the insured with the required independent counsel.313 The insurer can
also avoid liability to the third-party claimant by notifying the claimant
that it is no longer in charge of handling the claim.314 Should the insured
later be held liable, the insurer faces no extra-contractual liability. The
insured, by insisting on defending the claim, has relieved the insurer both
of its duty under Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.31 5 to accept reasonable
settlement offers 31 6 and its statutory duty to reasonably negotiate a
settlement. 17
It is also disingenuous to maintain, as the court seems to, that elimi-
nating the Royal Globe cause of action will thereby eliminate this so-
called conflict of interest. Assuming that the court is correct that the
Insurance Commissioner has sufficient power to punish insurers that vio-
late section 790.03(h) and further assuming that the Commissioner
would use the power,318 the "conflict of interest" remains: The remedial
mechanism changes but the parties' relationships and interests do not.
e. unanswered questions and analytical difficulties
The only complaint the Moradi-Shalal court leveled against Royal
Globe that is supported by case law is that Royal Globe raised more ques-
tions than it answered.31 Indeed, as the majority observed, several
Royal Globe actions were then awaiting supreme court review.320
Cal. App. 3d 59, 76, 203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533-34 (1984); see also CAL. CiV. CODE § 2860 (West
Supp. 1989).
313. See Tomerlin, 61 Cal. 2d at 647-48, 394 P.2d at 574-77, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 736-37;
Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 371, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 503; Purdy, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 76, 203 Cal.
Rptr. at 533-34. Most indemnity insurance contracts give control over the decision to settle to
the insurer. W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGE & H. LEVINE, supra note 17, §§ 3.01, 3.23[1]. In such
cases, the insurer may also be required to assign this power of settlement within the policy
limits to the insured in order to avoid bad faith liability. It must be remembered that the
situation is one where the insurer wishes to settle within the policy limits, but the insured
insists on a defense of the claim.
314. Comment, A Statutory Action For Insurer Bad Faith, supra note 256, at 965.
315. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
316. Id. at 430, 426 P.2d 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17.
317. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
318. See supra note 159 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's reasons for
not assuming that the Insurance Commissioner would not enforce section 790.03. In his dis-
sent, Justice Mosk noted that in the 29 years since the Unfair Practices Act was added to the
Insurance Code there is not one reported case of the Insurance Commissioner disciplining an
insurer for its unfair or deceptive acts against a claimant. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 317,
758 P.2d at 77, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
320. Id.
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The analytical difficulties cited by the court, however, are not insur-
mountable. Ironically, the majority eliminated one of these difficulties by
concluding that a final judicial determination of the insured's liability
must be obtained before a Royal Globe action may be brought against the
insurer.21 The rest of these difficulties could just as easily be resolved,
were the court willing to do so.
The court asserted that the primary analytical difficulty with Royal
Globe was its failure to formulate a standard of liability for bad faith
refusal to settle with a third party.322 Under section 790.03(h)(5), if there
is no rational basis for refusing a claim, the insurer who refuses to rea-
sonably negotiate with a claimant would be liable for bad faith. Contrary
to the court's assertion,323 section 790.03's plain language does not re-
quire an insurer to actually settle. In relevant part, section 790.03 pro-
vides that an insurer must "attempt[ ] in good faith to effectuate prompt,
fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become
reasonably clear." '324 Furthermore, before an insurer can be held liable
under section 790.03, a plaintiff must prove that the insurer knowingly
failed to attempt to negotiate.325 A reasonableness test would, therefore,
work quite well. The standard of liability should be no more complicated
than: Whether a reasonable insurer would knowingly refuse to attempt in
good faith to negotiate a settlement of the claim?
Insurers could not complain that this standard would be unprece-
dented. Insurers have been held to a reasonableness standard under
common-law first-party actions for bad faith failure to settle a claim. 326
This rule, established in Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.
3 27
and reaffirmed in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,328 binds insurers,
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, to act reason-
ably in the investigation and handling of claims.329
The court also cited as an "analytical difficulty" the issue of whether
to allow punitive damages and excessive awards to claimants who suf-
fered only minor damage as a result of insurer bad faith or against insur-
321. Id. at 313, 758 P.2d at 74-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133. See supra notes 166-99 and
accompanying text.
322. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
323. Id. at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
324. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
325. Id. § 790.03(h).
326. See, eg., Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 430, 426 P.2d at 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17;
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
327. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
328. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
329. See supra notes 8-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
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ers who only negligently violated section 790.03(h). 33° The problem
could easily have been resolved through applying existing law. 331 For
punitive damages to be awarded, California Civil Code section 3294 re-
quires that a plaintiff prove a defendant's fraud, oppression or malice
with clear and convincing evidence, and that the defendant act in "con-
scious disregard" of a person's rights.3 32 Applying these requirements in
Royal Globe actions based on an insurer's negligent violation of section
790.03(h)333 would have resulted in no award of punitive damages unless
the insurer acted with "conscious disregard. ' 334 Thus, insurers would
have been subject to the same damages that firms in any other industry
would be bound to pay should their actions cause injury to someone.335
Based on this simple resolution of two of the "analytical difficulties"
created by Royal Globe,336 it is apparent that the Moradi-Shalal court
could have attempted to resolve these difficulties. Instead, the majority
found "[r]econsideration of [Royal Globe] a far better alternative than
allowing ourselves to be swept deeper into the developing interpretive
whirlpool it has created.
'337
Overruling Royal Globe is arguably efficient and will undoubtedly
result in a less crowded supreme court docket. The court, however, side-
stepped its primary duty to settle disputes when there is no easy, mutu-
ally agreeable answer. As Justice Mosk pointedly accused:
Instead of concentrating on the issues raised and argued
throughout these and other pending proceedings, the majority
have chosen to avoid fundamental answers by permanently
eliminating the question. In most cases, of course, it would
make our task relatively uncomplicated if we could evade inter-
preting the law with finality by simply changing the law. On
the other hand, making our job easier is no justification for to-
tally destroying a cause of action.3 as
The court had an opportunity to clarify several of Royal Globe's analyti-
cal difficulties and to make Royal Globe a more workable precedent; it
chose not to.
330. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 302, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
331. Komblum, Punitive Damage Awards Against Insurers: Is This the Era of Abuse of the
Remedy, 13 BmiEF 9 (Fall 1984).
332. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
333. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
334. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.
335. Kornblum, supra note 331, at 10.
336. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
337. Id. at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
338. Id. at 314, 758 P.2d at 75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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The judicial effort in clarifying the parameters of the common-law
tort/contract action against insurers for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is an example of the court fulfilling its duty and
making a new precedent workable. After the tort's creation in Comunale
v. Traders & General Insurance Co.," the courts went on to clarify
many of the duties and analytical difficulties that attended this new cause
of action. In Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., the court determined
that damages for emotional distress could be recovered if they were the
proximate result of the insurer's bad faith failure to accept a reasonable
settlement offer within the policy limits.3 4 ' Other difficult issues, similar
to those cited by the Moradi-Shalal majority as being too difficult to re-
solve,342 were likewise resolved by the courts. Among these were the
issues of punitive damages,343 attorney's fees, 3" liability for the actions
of individual employees,345 the effect of an insurer's good faith in denying
coverage, 46 actions for contribution,347 the effect of an insured's insol-
339. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
340. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
341. Id. at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
342. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
343. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d. 809, 819-20, 598 P.2d 452, 457-58, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 487 (1979) (punitive and exemplary damages awards held appropriate in com-
mon-law bad faith cases); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 922, 582 P.2d 980, 986,
148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 395 (1975) (finding of insurer bad faith does not warrant punitive damages
absent showing of requisite intent); Chodos v. Insurance Co. of N. A., 126 Cal. App. 3d 86,
104, 178 Cal. Rptr. 831, 841 (1981) (sustaining award of $200,000 where compensatory and
emotional distress damages totalled $5,146.71).
344. Brandt v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 813, 819, 693 P.2d 796, 800, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211,
215 (1985) (attorney's fees recoverable as damages in bad faith action may not exceed amount
attributable to attorney's efforts to obtain amount due under insurance contract); Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d 105, 112-14, 149 Cal. Rptr. 313,
318-19 (1978) (attorney's fees incurred prosecuting bad faith action against insurer not recov-
erable); Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 361-64, 366, 118 Cal. Rptr.
581, 582-84, 586 (1975) (California Civil Code section 3333 authorizes recovery from insurer
of attorney's fees incurred in reaching settlement after insurer's breach of covenant of good
faith and fair dealing).
345. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 821-24, 598 P.2d at 458-59, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 488-90 (actions of
employees exercising broad discretion in handling claims can give rise to bad faith claim for
punitive damages against insurer). But see CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294(b) (West 1972 & Supp.
1989) (employer not liable for punitive damages for acts of employees unless employer had
advance notice of employee's unfitness or employer had either authorized or ratified wrongful
conduct).
346. Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 19, 538 P.2d
744, 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 294-95 (1975) (insurer liable for amount of judgment against
insured regardless of insurer's good faith belief that there was no coverage of claim).
347. Chicken Delight of Cal., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 841,
848, 111 Cal. Rptr. 79, 83 (1973) (contributor to settlement who is not party to insurance
contract may not sue insurer for bad faith failure to defend action).
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vency,34 s the effect of a third party's approval of a settlement offer being
required, 349 defining the availability of emotional distress damages,
350
subrogation 31 and the conflict of interest between the insurer and the
insured.352
The courts' ability to make Comunale and Crisci workable law is
positive proof that there are very few analytical problems that cannot be
overcome by a diligent judiciary. Thus, the so-called analytical difficul-
ties in Royal Globe, the only documented adverse effect of Royal Globe
cited by the Moradi-Shalal court,353 comprise no more substantial an ar-
gument for overturning Royal Globe than any of the other unsubstanti-
ated contentions of the majority. It is painfully obvious that the Moradi-
Shalal court first decided to overrule Royal Globe and then attempted to
marshall evidence to support its decision.
2. Judicial determination of the insured's liability as a prerequisite for
bringing a Royal Globe action
The majority expended considerable ink35 explaining its ruling that
Royal Globe requires a claimant to first receive a liability judgment
against the insured before bringing a statutory bad faith action against
the insurer.355 The court offered several policy arguments for its hold-
348. Shapero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 438, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244, 247-48
(1971) (insolvent estate held unable to sue insurer for bad faith failure to settle within policy
limits if there are no assets or financial interests to be harmed by excess judgment).
349. Coe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 981, 990-92, 136 Cal. Rptr.
331, 335-37 (1977) (settlement offers made without approval of necessary third party are inef-
fective, and insurer's refusal cannot give rise to a bad faith claim by insured).
350. Bogard, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 617, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88 (insurer's disclaiming any
duty to represent insured's interests at crucial stage of underlying action is "outrageous" con-
duct warranting award of emotional distress damages in bad faith action against the insurer);
Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 241, 102 Cal. Rptr.
547, 553 (1972) (defining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support recovery for emotional
distress in a Crisci action).
351. Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 917-18,
610 P.2d 1038, 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980) (duty owed excess liability insurer by
primary insurer is identical to that owed insured).
352. Bogard, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 611, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84 (once conflict arises, insurer
may not compel insured to surrender control of litigation). Accord Purdy, 157 Cal. App. 3d at
76, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34; Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 371, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
353. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303-04, 758 P.2d at 67-68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
354. The majority opinion is twenty-one pages long. Eight of these pages are devoted solely
to the requirement of a prior judicial determination of the insured's liability in pending Royal
Globe cases. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 305-13, 758 P.2d at 69-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-33.
Justice Mosk's dissent is eight pages long. Id. at 313-21, 758 P.2d at 75-80, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
133-38 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 305-13, 758 P.2d at 69-75, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127-33.
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ing.356 But the main pillar on which the court rested its ruling was a line
of California Court of Appeal cases that interpret Royal Globe as requir-
ing as a prerequisite a final judicial determination of the insured's liabil-
ity.357  This line of cases began with Doser v. Middlesex Mutual
Insurance Co.,358 in which the court held that Royal Globe required a
determination of the insured's liability as a condition precedent to a
Royal Globe action against the insurer.359 Nationwide Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court,3" Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co.,361 and Heninger
v. Foremost Insurance Co.362 all followed Doser. The Moradi-Shalal ma-
jority held that these cases correctly interpreted Royal Globe.363
Careful examination, however, reveals a basic flaw in the reasoning
of those cases which undermines their interpretation of Royal Globe.
The Doser court interpreted Royal Globe to require a judgment of the
insured's liability as a prerequisite to a third-party Royal Globe action
based on the following quotation from Royal Globe: "[T]he third party
suit may not be brought until the action between the injured party and
356. Id. at 311-12, 758 P.2d at 73-74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32. First, the court asserted
that the need to prove the insured's liability during the Royal Globe action against the insured
was prejudicial to the insurer on the grounds that the existence of an insurance policy would be
known to the jury. Id. at 311, 758 P.2d at 73-74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32. The court held this
as being in conflict with Evidence Code section 1155, which forbids introducing "[e]vidence
that a person was, at the time a harm was suffered by another, insured wholly or partially
against loss arising from liability for that harm... to prove negligence or wrongdoing." Id.
(quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155 (West 1966)). The court further viewed the jury's knowl-
edge that the defendant in a Royal Globe action is an insurer and that insurance was an inte-
gral part of the case as prejudicing the determination of the liability of the insured. Id.
Second, the court saw the introduction of evidence of a settlement between the insured
and the claimant as also being prejudicial to the insurer. Id. However, Evidence Code section
1152 prohibits the admission of a settlement into evidence to prove the settling party's liability.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (West 1966 & Supp. 1989). Thus, this prejudice will never occur
and is therefore illusory.
Third, the court reasoned that allowing a suit against an insurer after a settlement would
rob the settling parties of the advantage of settlement by forcing them to litigate the very claim
they had sought to avoid. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 312, 758 P.2d at 74, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
132. The court actually viewed such a post-settlement suit as a penalty against the insured,
who has already paid a settlement, and a windfall to the claimant, who received that settle-
ment. Id. The court ignored the possibility that the claimant may have suffered significant
injuries as a result of the insurer's bad faith. It is entirely likely that the insurer's bad faith
refusal to settle has forced the claimant to accept a settlement far below its actual worth. To
insulate insurers from bad faith liability merely because a claimant has accepted a settlement
for his claim against an insured is to allow insurers to retain the fruits of their bad faith acts.
357. Id. at 306-09, 758 P.2d at 70-72, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 128-30.
358. 101 Cal. App. 3d 883, 162 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1980).
359. Id. at 891, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
360. 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1982).
361. 157 Cal. App. 3d 957, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984).
362. 175 Cal. App. 3d 830, 221 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1985).
363. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 308, 758 P.2d at 71, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
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the insured is concluded ... [and] the liability of the insured is first
determined .... ,,36. This quotation is entirely misleading as to the ac-
tual contents of the Royal Globe opinion because the ellipses represents a
seven page gap. 65 Such a flagrant misrepresentation of the contents of an
opinion should not serve as the foundation for legitimate interpretation.
Thus, Doser and its progeny are a hastily constructed house of cards, and
cannot legitimately support the Moradi-Shalal holding.
The California Supreme Court itself said in Coleman v. Gulf Insur-
ance Co.,366 "[tihe more plausible interpretation of [section 790.03], sub-
division (h)(5) is that the provision was intended to apply only to
prejudgment conduct. '367 This focus on the insurer's prejudgment con-
duct, together with Royal Globe's purpose of curtailing unfair practices
and encouraging fair settlements, leads to the conclusion that no prior
judgment against the insured ought to be required of an injured claimant
as a condition for bringing a Royal Globe suit.368
Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 369 recognized the "pos-
sibility of abuse by insurance companies who might entice a settlement
by unfair practices, [and] then seek to hide behind the cloak of that set-
tlement." 370 For example, assume that an insurer advises a claimant not
to obtain the services of an attorney (a violation of section
790.03(h)(14)) 37' and subsequently misleads the claimant as to the appli-
cable statute of limitations (a violation of section 790.03(h)(15)). 3 72 As a
direct result of the insurer's violations of the Unfair Practices Act, the
claimant has lost its entire cause of action against the insured and will be
unable even to negotiate a settlement, let alone obtain the necessary judi-
cial determination of the insured's liability. Under this set of facts the
insurer is actually rewarded for its violations of section 790.03.173 The
364. Doser, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 891, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 120 (quoting Royal Globe Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 884, 892, 592 P.2d 329, 332, 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845, 850
(1979)).
365. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842 (1979). The seven page gap represents the complete text of the Royal Globe opinion
excluding the statement of facts. Id. at 884-92, 592 P.2d at 332-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845-50,
366. 41 Cal. 3d 782, 718 P.2d 77, 226 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1986).
367. Id. at 796-97, 718 P.2d at 85, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99.
368. Abeltin & Aitken, supra note 256, at 67.
369. 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983).
370. Id. at 56, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
371. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(14) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
372. Id. § 790.03(h)(15).
373. Another danger is that in violating the Unfair Practices Act, an insurer will most likely
compel much lower settlements than they would normally pay for a particular claim. Since
this illegally reached settlement shields the insurer from any liability for its actions, the
Moradi-Shalal court's ruling actually encourages insurers to violate the Unfair Practices Act.
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majority's requirement of a prior judicial determination of the insured's
liability actually encourages insurers to make certain that their unfair
practices result in a settlement, thereby barring any liability for the viola-
tions. Thus, to permit Royal Globe actions after settlement is the only
way to protect claimants who are forced to accept a minimal settlement
as a result of an insurer's bad faith and still encourage the equitable set-
tlement of claims.
3. Stare decisis
The Moradi-Shalal court legitimized its review of Royal Globe by
first paying homage to the doctrine of stare decisis.374 The majority
presented a survey of cases that support the reconsideration of precedent
"when subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was un-
sound, or has become ripe for reconsideration. ' 375 The court then found
Royal Globe and developments subsequent to it to fit within this view.376
However, a reading of the two cases principally relied upon by the
Moradi-Shalal majority reveals that the court stretched them to the
breaking point. The court cited People v. Anderson 3 77 as demonstrating
how subsequent circumstances can require review of an earlier case.378
The Anderson court had reviewed and ultimately overruled Carlos v. Su-
perior Court,379 a California death penalty case, due to interim changes in
federal law.380
The subsequent changes in federal law that necessitated review of
Carlos were two cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States, Cabana v. Bullock 38 1 and Tison v. Arizona,3" 2 which flatly contra-
Of course, the injured claimant is free to complain to the Insurance Commissioner. See supra
notes 207-08 and accompanying text to ascertain the likelihood of success using this method.
374. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 62, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. The court
stated the "fundamental jurisprudential policy [is] that prior applicable precedent usually must
be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the
current justices." Id. As mentioned above, the court was more than willing to violate this
"fundamental jurisprudential policy" in its discussion of "additional legislative history." See
supra notes 261-69 and accompanying text.
375. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (citing People
v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1138-41, 742 P.2d 1306, 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 604-06
(1987)).
376. Id. at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
377. 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
378. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 297, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
379. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983) (requiring intent to kill in order
for a defendant convicted of felony murder to receive the death penalty).
380. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1147, 742 P.2d at 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
381. 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
382. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
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dicted Carlos' interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Undoubtedly,
such a profound subsequent change in constitutional law justifies review
of prior opinions that contradict present law. But to equate the mythical
and inconclusive developments which the court insisted followed Royal
Globe with a pair of directly relevant, dispositive United States Supreme
Court opinions is to engage in gross exaggeration.383
The Moradi-Shalal majority cited Cianci v. Superior Court 314 for the
proposition that stare decisis ought not prevent correction of judicial
blunders, 385 and that scholarly criticism justifies reviewing prior deci-
sions " 'to determine [their] continuing viability.' "386 Cianci overruled
Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hospital Association 387 by holding that
the medical profession is within the purview of California's antitrust stat-
ute, the Cartwright Act.388
Again there is a great disparity between the quantity and quality of
developments supporting the court's review of prior precedent in Cianci
and that which occurred prior to Moradi-Shalal. In Cianci, two prior
California Supreme Court opinions had implicitly contradicted Willis by
giving the Cartwright Act broad application in similar areas.38 9 Also,
there was a change in federal law that encouraged a reexamination of
Willis' narrow reading of the Cartwright Act. 90 In Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar,39 1 the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted the
Sherman Antitrust Act to include professions.392 This change directly
affected the interpretation of the Cartwright Act, because the Cartwright
Act had intended to go beyond the Sherman Act in its regulation of trade
practices.393
383. As demonstrated above, few if any of the subsequent developments listed by the
Moradi-Shalal court withstand close scrutiny. See supra notes 225-353 and accompanying
text.
384. 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985).
385. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (citing Cianci
v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 924, 710 P.2d 375, 387, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 587 (1985)).
386. Id. at 299, 758 P.2d at 65, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 123 (quoting Cianci v. Superior Court, 40
Cal. 3d 903, 921, 710 P.2d 375, 385, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 585 (1985)).
387. 58 Cal. 2d 806, 376 P.2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1962).
388. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 924-25, 710 P.2d at 387-88, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 587; see CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 16700-17101 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
389. See Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 43-45, 172 P.2d 867, 873-74
(1946) (Cartwright Act protects against restraint of insurance trade); Matin County Bd. of
Realtors v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 928, 549 P.2d 833, 835-36, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1976)
(Cartwright Act applies to service industries).
390. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 920, 710 P.2d at 384, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
391. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
392. Id. at 787.
393. Cianci, 40 Cal. 3d at 920, 710 P.2d at 384, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
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As for the assertion that Cianci supports review of precedent met
with scholarly criticism, the Cianci court merely mentioned in a single
sentence the existence of commentary critical of the Willis decision.394
Such fleeting language hardly supports the Moradi-Shalal court's basing
a substantial portion of its "irrefutable" argument that Royal Globe
should be overruled on the existence of negative legal commentary. 395
By insisting that the developments following Royal Globe fit within
the Anderson and Cianci holdings, the Moradi-Shalal court ignored the
heart of the doctrine of stare decisis. Under Moradi-Shalal, to obtain
review of a particular precedent a party need only show that some legal
commentators did not agree with the court's reasoning or feel that a par-
ticular precedent is no longer viable,396 and that the decision is rumored
to have resulted in some non-verifiable difficulties. 397 This highly discre-
tionary standard is fundamentally inconsistent with the "'assumption
that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objec-
tives of the legal system,'" which allows parties to "'regulate their con-
duct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the
governing rules of law.' "91
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF MORADI-SHALAL v FIREMAN'S FUND
INSURANCE COMPANIES
The majority in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos. 3 99
maintained that its holding is confined to overruling Royal Globe Insur-
ance Co. v. Superior Court's'° interpretation of Insurance Code sections
790.034°1 and 790.09;402 that is, that the sections do not confer on third-
party claimants a private cause of action against insurers." 3 Even so, the
majority's holding and means of reaching it will have several immediate
and possibly long-range effects upon society and California law.'
394. Id. at 921, 710 P.2d at 385, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 585.
395. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
396. Id. at 296-97, 758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. See supra notes 250-60 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Moradi-Shalal court's use of critical legal
commentary.
397. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296-97, 758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121. See
supra notes 289-353 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Moradi-Shalal court's use
of subsequent developments and analytical difficulties.
398. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 62-63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (quoting 9
WrrriN, CAL. PROCEDURE, Appeal § 758, at 726 (3d ed. 1985)).
399. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
400. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
401. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
402. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972).
403. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27.
404. The most immediate effect of Moradi-Shalal is that it implicitly overrules Homestead
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First, third-party claimants' only recourse is to complain to the In-
surance Commissioner." It is doubtful that individuals who suffer sig-
nificant harm at the hands of an insurer will regard this as adequate
relief. The Insurance Commissioner has no power to order damages be
paid over to claimants. 4 6 Thus, in a situation where a claimant suffers
significant financial injury due to the insurer's bad faith, the Insurance
Commissioner cannot provide adequate relief.
4
1
7
The adequacy of the administrative remedy was further crippled by
the Moradi-Shalal court's ruling that an insurer may be held to have
violated the Unfair Practices Act"4' only if the violation is committed
"knowingly" and "with such frequency as to indicate a general business
practice." 4 9 Thus, third-party claimants may not even claim adminis-
trative relief against insurers for negligent or even reckless violations of
the Insurance Code during the claims settlement process. 410  Moreover,
even intentional violations are beyond the jurisdiction of the Insurance
Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 147 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978), Shern-
off v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1975), and Greenberg v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973). These three
cases preceded Royal Globe and held that section 790.09 provides a private right of action. See
supra notes 49-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Greenberg and Shernoff opin-
ions. Justice Mosk, in his dissent, assumed that these cases were now overruled and accused
the majority of being "curiously silent about it." Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 320, 758 P.2d at
79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
The demise of Greenberg is particularly distressing. In Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W.
Fin. Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305, 444 P.2d 481, 70 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1968), the California Supreme
Court held that both California's antitrust "statutes and the common law... are now ex-
pressly superseded and contravened by [section 790.03] of the Insurance Code." Id. at 322,
444 P.2d at 492, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 860. The Greenberg court held that a private litigant may sue
an insurer who violates section 790.03 by restraining trade. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at
1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475. Thus, by implicitly overruling Greenberg, the Moradi-Shalal
court has left consumers with no avenue of redress for damages caused by an insurer's restraint
of trade.
405. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.04 (West 1972).
406. The Insurance Commissioner is empowered only to issue cease-and-desist orders, issue
injunctions to restrain illegal conduct, invoke fines and penalties and suspend licenses for one
year. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475; see also CAL. INS. CODE
§§ 790.05-.07 (West 1972).
407. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1974). See supra note 293 for a discussion of Silberg and the harm suffered by the plaintiff
claimant as a result of the insurer's bad faith during the claim settlement process. There is no
way a cease-and-desist order or an injunction against future conduct could make the plaintiff
in Silberg whole.
408. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
409. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 303, 758 P.2d at 67-68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126 (quoting
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1972 & Supp. 1989)).
410. The only claimants who will be protected are those first-party claimants that are claim-
ing under their own insurance policies. The only claimants able to sue an insurer are those
that can prove an insurer's fraud or suffer such severe harm as to give rise to a claim to
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Commissioner unless they can be shown to be part of a pattern indicating
a "general business practice."' Under Moradi-Shalal, insurers may vi-
olate section 790.03 whenever they feel it is in their best interest without
fear of penalty so long as they do not do it often enough to make it a
general business practice. 12 The Moradi-Shalal majority warned that its
decision "is not an invitation to the insurance industry to commit the
unfair practices proscribed by the Insurance Code." '413 This is akin to
saying an unguarded pot of honey is not an invitation for a bear to come
to dinner.
Second, the Moradi-Shalal decision could portend the eventual
abandonment of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,"' the bedrock of com-
mon-law bad faith actions.4" 5 The Greenberg court observed that unless
the Insurance Code is construed to allow "the person to whom the civil
liability runs... [to] enforce it by an appropriate action," Crisci would
be overturned "by implication."4 6 The Crisci court, in holding that an
insurer's bad faith gives rise to tort as well as contract damages,41 7 relied
upon the fundamental principle that "for every wrong there is a remedy
and that an injured party should be compensated for all damage proxi-
mately caused by the wrongdoer. '418 By limiting claimants' causes of
action against insurers for harm suffered during the claims settlement
process to fraud and infliction of emotional distress, 419 the Moradi-Shalal
court has essentially denied a remedy for conduct that the Legislature
views as harmful. And in the case of insurer negligence, there is not even
available the minimal satisfaction of an administrative remedy.420 Under
emotional distress. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
127.
411. Id.
412. Since insureds are still able to sue under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
the most likely target of insurer abuse will be the third-party claimant. The inequitable nature
of this insulation of the insurance industry from liability is particularly outrageous in light of
the strict liability imposed on other industries under the products liability doctrine. What if a
pharmaceutical manufacturer was allowed to escape liability for its negligent manufacture of a
dangerous drug? Or an auto-maker faced no liability for intentionally placing a dangerous
vehicle on the market because it had only done so once? Such results are, of course, unthink-
able, yet rulings nearly as obnoxious will be obtained through application of the Moradi-Shalal
holding.
413. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304, 758 P.2d at 68, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
414. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
415. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
416. Greenberg, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 1001 & n.5, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 475 & n.5 (1973).
417. Crisci, 66 Cal. 3d at 533, 426 P.2d at 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
418. Id., 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19.
419. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
420. See supra notes 405-13 and accompanying text.
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Moradi-Shalal, the Crisci doctrine mandating there be a remedy for every
harm may be no longer operative.
Even if Moradi-Shalal has not implicitly overruled Crisci, the court
has laid the foundation for eventually overruling the case. Applying
Moradi-Shalal's new approach to stare decisis421 reveals how easily the
California Supreme Court could overrule Crisci if it is so inclined. First,
since regulation of the insurance industry is a "'matter of continuing
concern' to the community at large,"422 there is just as much "need" to
reexamine Crisci for "'court-created error'" as there was to reexamine
Royal Globe.423
Second, the court would have no more trouble contriving negative
subsequent developments resulting from Crisci than it did in Moradi-
Shalal.424 For example, some states have followed Crisci;425 others have
refused to do so,4 26 or have limited some facet of the Crisci holding.427
Although this rejection of Crisci is not as broad as the rejection of Royal
Globe,428 an active court could pounce upon these rejections as a "nega-
tive subsequent development" under Moradi-Shalal. As for legal com-
421. See supra notes 374-98 and accompanying text.
422. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 296, 758 P.2d at 63, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 121 (quoting Peo-
ple v. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1147, 742 P.2d 1306, 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 611 (1987)).
423. Id. (quoting Cianci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 924, 710 P.2d 375, 387, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 575, 587 (1985)).
424. See supra notes 225-353 and accompanying text for an analysis of the subsequent de-
velopments used by the Moradi-Shalal court in overruling Royal Globe.
425. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980);
State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 19 Ariz. App. 594, 509 P.2d 725
(1973); Grand Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Protection Mut. Ins., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375 A.2d 428
(1977); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1986); Trahan v.
Century Mut. Ins. Co., 219 So. 2d 287 (La. 1969); Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 210 Mont.
267, 682 P.2d 725 (1984); Lujan v. Gonzales, 84 N.M. 229, 501 P.2d 673, cert. denied, 84 N.M.
219, 501 P.2d 663 (1972); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla.
1977); Diamon v. Pennsylvania Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 247 Pa. Super. 534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977);
Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wash. App. 167, 473 P.2d 193 (1970).
426. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93, 156 S.E.2d
809, aff'd, 223 Ga. 789, 158 S.E.2d 243 (1967); Koppie v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d
844 (Iowa 1973); Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976); Craig v. Iowa Kemper Mut. Ins. Co., 565 S.W.2d 716 (Mo. App.
1978); Lawton v. Great S.W. Fire Ins. Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Newton v.
Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E.2d 297, 303 (1976); Santilli v. State Farm Life
Ins. Co., 278 Or. 53, 562 P.2d 965 (1977); English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983).
427. See, e.g., Sanford v. Western Life Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d 260, 264 (Ala. 1979) (does not
allow damages for emotional distress caused by insurer's bad faith); Farmers Group, Inc. v.
Trimble, 658 P.2d 1370, 1375 (Colo. App. 1982) (requires insurer to act intentionally or will-
fully before common-law bad faith liability can be imposed); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 266-67 (Miss. 1988) (limiting instances giving rise to insurer
liability).
428. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
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mentary, Crisci has generated its fair share of scholarly criticism. At
least eight legal commentaries view Crisci negatively.42 9 Furthermore,
the court will not need to manufacture any subsequent or additional leg-
islative history to overrule Crisci because it is a judicially created doc-
trine. That the Legislature has not affirmatively embraced Crisci may
leave it open to review under Moradi-Shalal's new approach to stare de-
cisis.430 Only the court's imagination will limit formulation of adverse
consequences and analytical difficulties resulting from Crisci.43 1 Clearly,
should the court wish to overrule Crisci, it has already laid the ground-
work for constructing another "irrefutable" argument.
VII. CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Cos.432 is a major victory for the insurance industry. The industry is
now free to treat third-party claimants as it wishes, with the only stick
over its head being the enforcement powers of the Insurance Commis-
sioner. It is true that the Insurance Commissioner is now an elected offi-
cial.433  However, the insurance industry represents one of the most
powerful political forces in the state.434 This strength was demonstrated
429. See, eg., Hills & Pivnicka, Development and Direction of the California Bad Faith
Insurance Doctrine or "0 Ye of Little Faith." 8 U.S.F. L. Rlv. 29 (1973); Louderback, Stan-
dards For Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187 (1982);
Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Towards a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGs L.J. 639,
659 (1980); Marchiano, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Partridge: Expanding The
Scope of Insurance Liability in California, 7 PAc. L. J. 859 (1982); Nye, Gifford, Webb, &
Dewar, The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An analysis of Claims Data and Insur-
ance Company Finances, 76 GEo L. J. 1495, 1560 (1988); Putz, Commercial Bad Faith: Attor-
ney Fees-Not Tort Liability-Is the Remedy For "Stonewalling," 21 U.S.F. L. Rv. 419, 451
(1987); Roberts, The "Good Faith" Settlement An Accommodation of Competing Goals, 17
LOY. L.A.L. REv. 841, 910-11 n.281 (1984); Tuohey, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Arising From a Breach of Contract: Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 8 Sw. U.L.
REv. 655, 661-64 (1976). One of the articles cited by the Moradi-Shalal court perceives Cali-
fornia's bad faith laws as a failed experiment that sought to reduce the costs of administering
the tort recovery system by encouraging or coercing settlement. Allen, supra note 117, at 852-
54.
430. See supra notes 374-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Moradi-Shalal
court's treatment of stare decisis.
431. Several commentators have accused Crisci of increasing the costs of settlement for
insurers. See, e-g., Roberts, supra note 429, at 911 n.281. Others have argued that Crisci has
hampered the settlement process by creating conflicting duties and interests for the insurer.
See, e-g., Marchiano, supra note 429, at 75.
432. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
433. CAL. INS. CODE § 12900 (West Supp. 1989). Section 12900 was added to the Insur-
ance Code when Proposition 103 was ratified in the 1988 general election.
434. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 320, 758 P.2d at 79, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 137 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
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in the last election, where the insurance industry spent over sixty million
dollars combating propositions intended to regulate automobile insur-
ance rates.435 Therefore, since it is likely that the next Insurance Com-
missioner will be the candidate supported by the insurance industry, the
Unfair Practices Act436 now appears to be a law without gums let alone
teeth.
The Moradi-Shalal holding could be overturned by the California
Legislature.437 This remedial legislation need only state that California
Insurance Code section 790.03(h) affords private litigants, including
third-party claimants, the right to sue an insurer for any violations of
that section.438 Such an addition to the Insurance Code by the Legisla-
ture would affirmatively embrace the Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Supe-
nor Court439 holding and partially overrule Moradi-Shalal. If the
Legislature wishes to completely overrule Moradi-Shalal, it is suggested
that the Legislature further revise the Insurance Code to allow private
litigants to sue for individual violations of section 790.03(h),440 and to
enable the suing party to establish the insured's liability as part of the
action against the insurer.441 Reinstatement of Royal Globe would re-
store the statutory protection from insurer bad faith which third-party
claimants need" 2 and are deprived of under Moradi-Shalal.
It is not likely, however, that such legislation will be passed. As
demonstrated above, the insurance industry is capable of overwhelming
lobbying efforts. Thus, it is reasonable to predict that Royal Globe will
remain little more than a reminder of a time when the insurance industry
was required to actually pay for the damages it caused in bad faith deal-
ings with insureds and claimants.
Although this insulation of the insurance industry is certainly dis-
tressing, the greatest cause for alarm is the ease with which the court was
willing to destroy an entire cause of action it had created in a decade-old
landmark case. Essentially, no decision is safe if it has been criticized in
435. Reich, Insurance: Lawyers vs, Insurers, L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1988, part I, at 3, col. 1.
436. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 790-790.10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1989).
437. The Moradi-Shalal court invited the Legislature to pass legislation expressly creating
such a cause of action. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 305, 758 P.2d at 69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
438. Id.
439. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
440. See supra notes 408-13 and accompanying text.
441. See supra notes 166-99 and accompanying text. The Legislature could also address
some of the difficulties cited by the Moradi-Shalal court, such as the test for liability or puni-
tive damages. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
442. Comment, A Statutory Action For Insurer Bad Faith, supra note 256, at 952-53.
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legal periodicals or, in the case of a statutory interpretation, if it has not
been affirmatively embraced by the Legislature.
Tobin Lippert *
* The author wishes to thank Prof. Fred Lower for his help in the preparation of this
Note.
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